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INTRODUCTION
The quest to sentence defendants fairly and effectively has led
countries and communities continually to reform their sentencing sys-
tems. In a recent example of such reform, the United States Congress
established the United States Sentencing Commission to draft federal
sentencing guidelines.' Deep concerns about unwarranted disparity
of sentences fueled the transformation to guidelines sentencing, from
the previous system of discretionary sentencing aimed at rehabilita-
tion.2 Under the previous system, defendants who had committed the
same crime and had the same prior criminal record could receive dra-
matically different sentences. Congress directed the Commission to
develop guidelines that would reduce this disparity.3
Given this broad mandate, the Commission developed detailed
presumptive guidelines that require federal judges to make specific
factual determinations at sentencing about the nature of the offense
and the defendant's criminal history.4 The guidelines then translate
these factual determinations into fines or months of probation or in-
carceration. The core principle-that specific factual determinations
by the court directly produce identifiable consequences-was in-
tended to reduce disparity in outcomes for similar defendants. To
accomplish this goal, factual determinations must be accurate.
1 Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1987 (1984) (codified
as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 3551-3742 (1988), 28 U.S.C. §§ 991-98 (1988)).
2 During the 1970s judges and scholars paid great attention to the problem of sen-
tencing. Judge Marvin E. Frankel was a leading critic of unfettered sentencing discretion
and a proponent of sentencing reform. MARviN E. FRANKEL, CRIMINAL SENTENCES: LAW
WITHOUT ORDER (1972). His call for reform was supported by other thoughtful literature
about sentencing disparity and its causes. E.g., ROBERT 0. DAWSON, SENTENCING: THE DECI-
SION AS TO TYPE, LENGTH, AND CONDITIONS OF SENTENCE (1969); WILLARD GAYLN, PARTIAL
JUSTICE: A STUDY OF BIAS IN SENTENCING (1974);JOHN HoGARTH, SENTENCING AS A HUMAN
PROCESS (1971); PIERCE O'DONNELL ET AL, TOWARD AJUST AND EFFECTVE SENTENCING SYS-
TEM: AGENDA FOR LEGISLATIVE REFORM (1977); RESEARCH ON SENTENCING: THE SEARCH FOR
REFORM (Alfred Blumstein et al. eds., 1983); ANDREW VON HIRSCH, DOING JUSTICE: THE
CHOICE OF PUNISHMENTS (1976).
3 In establishing the United States Sentencing Commission, Congress stated that one
of its purposes was to establish policies and practices that:
provide certainty and fairness in meeting the purposes of sentencing, avoid-
ing unwarranted sentencing disparities among defendants with similar records who
have been found guilty of similar criminal conduct while maintaining sufficient
flexibility to permit individualized sentences when warranted by mitigating
or aggravating factors not taken into account in the establishment of gen-
eral sentencing practices.
28 U.S.C. § 991(b) (1) (B) (1988) (emphasis added). For a discussion of the importance of
considering the purposes of sentencing, see Marc Miller, Purposes at Sentencing, 66 S. CAL.
L. REv. 413 (1992).
4 For a discussion of the reasoning and compromises of the Commission, see Ste-
phen Breyer, The Federal Sentencing Guidelines and the Key Compromises Upon Which They Rest,
17 HoFsTRA L. REv. 1 (1988).
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Concurrent with reducing disparity, Congress wanted the Com-
mission to develop a system that would assure sentences were fair,
both in the individual case and in the overall pattern of sentences. 5
Congress directed that a defendant should receive an appropriate sen-
tence, but not more than that. This means that the imposition of fact-
finding standards should not unfairly burden individual defendants.
Despite the goal of fair sentencing, Congress, the Sentencing Com-
mission, and the courts have failed to impose the necessary standards
to ensure fair and reliable fact-finding. 6
The accuracy of fact-finding is determined by the burden of
proof, the reliability of the underlying evidence, and the opportunity
for review of the decision. The burden of proof for questions of fact
at pre-guidelines sentencing was low-a mere preponderance of the
evidence. 7 Moreover, courts could consider virtually any evidence
without regard to its admissibility under the Federal Rules of Evi-
dence.8 The Supreme Court held that these standards met the re-
quirements of the Constitution. 9
In establishing sentencing guidelines, neither Congress nor the
Commission adjusted the burden of proof at sentencing ° or the stan-
dards for the reliability of evidence, although Congress did provide
the safeguard of appellate review.1' Courts have held generally that
sentencing under the guidelines is not so different from pre-guide-
lines sentencing that higher standards are constitutionally
mandated.12
5 S. REP. No. 225, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 52-56 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N.
3182, 3235-39.
6 One commentator, writing before the federal guidelines were adopted, foresaw
that " [t] o truly eliminate disparity, sentencing reformers must standardize not only substan-
tive sentencing law, but also the procedures that bring to the sentencer the facts to which
that law will be applied." Peter B. Pope, How Unreliable Facfinding Can Undermine Sentencing
Guidelines, 95 YALE L.J. 1258, 1264 (1986). Pope reviewed the Minnesota guidelines sen-
tencing model and pointed out the importance of fact determinations at each stage of the
criminal case.
7 See discussion infra part I.A.3.
8 See discussion infra part I.A.
9 See discussion infra part I.A2.
10 Neither Congress nor the Commission initially specified what burden of proof
should apply at sentencing, leaving the matter for the courts to resolve. The Commission
has not subsequently issued a guideline or policy statement on this issue. However, in an
amendment that became effective on November 1, 1991, the Commission indicated in the
commentary to § 6A1.3 that the preponderance standard is appropriate. UNITED STATES
SENTENCING COMM'N, GUIDELNES MANUmaz APPENDIX C 216 (1991) (amending the Com-
mentary to § 6A1.3) [hereinafterU.S.S.G.].
11 The statute provides that the defendant as well as the government may appeal a
sentence. 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a),(b).
12 See discussion infra parts I.A.2 and I.A3. There have been strong dissents to these
rulings, including a dissent by Justice White to a denial of certiorari by the Supreme Court.
Kinder v. United States, 112 S. Ct. 2290 (1992); see discussion infra note 217.
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The reliance by the Commission and courts on pre-guidelines
cases to decide constitutional standards for guidelines sentencing is
unsatisfactory for two reasons. First, the Commission and courts have
failed to question the original reasoning of the cases establishing the
constitutional standards. This article contends that even under pre-
guidelines sentencing evidentiary standards were inadequate. Sec-
ond, the inadequacy of these standards is even greater with guidelines
sentencing.' 3 Discretion in pre-guidelines sentencing permitted
judges to vary their reliance on evidence depending on its level of
reliability. Restricting judges' ability to exercise discretion and di-
rectly basing sentences on factual determinations, when combined
with a failure to raise the reliability standards, has created an unjust
sentencing scheme.
A constitutional requirement identified by the Commission or
the courts is not the only possible mandate for stricter evidentiary
standards at sentencing. There is an alternative solution. The federal
judiciary and Congress have the authority to adopt stricter evidentiary
standards through rules. This article presents an affirmative analysis
of why applying the Federal Rules of Evidence at sentencing would
improve fact-finding.
Two key harms to be avoided in fact-finding at guidelines sen-
tencing are inaccuracy in fact-finding and having defendants unfairly
bear the burden of errors in fact-finding. In light of these potential
harms, this Article analyzes the potential impact of raising the burden
of proof at sentencing and of increasing the standards for admissibil-
ity of evidence at sentencing. Adjusting the burden of proof clearly
affects who will benefit if the evidence is inadequate, but does not
necessarily improve the accuracy of fact-finding. Assessing how higher
reliability standards for the admissibility of evidence, such as those re-
quired by the Federal Rules of Evidence, would affect sentencing in-
volves a more complex analysis.
Who bears the burden of proof at sentencing, the likelihood that
evidence offered will be inculpatory, and the probability that evidence
that would be inadmissible at trial is more likely to be false than ad-
missible evidence-all these affect the calculation of the impact of evi-
dence at sentencing. At best, the use at sentencing of evidence
generally inadmissible at trial, such as hearsay, may increase accuracy
while also increasing the number of errors being borne by defendants.
However, as the analysis demonstrates, limiting evidence at sentencing
to that which meets the Federal Rules of Evidence will ensure that
defendants do not unfairly bear the burden of errors and is likely to
13 Judge Bright of the Eighth Circuit recently noted that "[w] hen it comes to proof of
facts undergirding guideline sentences, the principle courts often apply is... 'Anything
Goes.'" United States v. Smiley, 997 F.2d 475, 483 (8th Cir. 1993) (BrightJ., dissenting).
302 [Vol. 79:299
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also increase accuracy of fact-finding. 14 The Federal Rules of Evi-
dence, which are generally neutral to both the defendant and the gov-
ernment, provide the most effective method for improving fact-
finding at sentencing.
Congress or the federal judiciary can extend application of the
Federal Rules of Evidence beyond the culpability phase of trials to
govern sentencing.' 5 The evidence rules could efficiently be incorpo-
rated into the existing sentencing scheme, where both parties are rep-
resented by counsel familiar with the rules. Application of evidence
rules at sentencing may even be preferable to finding a constitutional
requirement for heightened evidentiary standards. Application of the
rules would ensure comprehensive reform, rather than piecemeal so-
lutions to specific problems, while still permitting refinement through
amendments.
Part I of this Article traces the development of current proce-
dural protections from early American sentencing through the recent
adoption of guidelines sentencing. Part II examines how federal
courts are currently wrestling with guidelines sentencing under the
pre-existing procedural standards. This section discusses how courts
have considered increasing sentencing reliability by finding a constitu-
tional requirement for a heightened burden of proof, finding a right
of confrontation at sentencing, or adopting specialized rules for fact-
finding at sentencing.
Part III presents a new argument for heightened procedural pro-
tections. This section applies theories of evidence to fact-finding at
sentencing to demonstrate what errors in fact-finding exist under the
guidelines, who should bear the consequences of errors, and what
choices are available for reducing errors. Part III concludes that im-
proved reliability is best accomplished by applying the Federal Rules
of Evidence.
Part IV reviews the issues that arise at sentencing in light of the
proposed application of evidentiary rules. This section demonstrates
that the Federal Rules of Evidence governing reliability of evidence
could readily be applied at sentencing. The Article concludes by ex-
plaining how the existing rules could be extended to sentencing.
Judges, academics, and practicing lawyers continue to debate the
extent to which specific factual determinations should mandate spe-
cific sentences. 16 As long as judges are required to make such fact
14 See discussion infra part III.
15 See discussion infra part IV.C.
16 Judges, academics, and practicing lawyers continue to criticize the Federal Sentenc-
ing Guidelines and the United States Sentencing Commission for a variety of reasons in-
cluding failure to reduce disparity, failure to respond to judicial suggestions for
amendments, excessive curtailment of judicial discretion, and continued use of an overly
broad definition of relevant conduct. E.g., United States v. Concepcion, 983 F.2d 369, 393
1994]
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determinations at sentencing and to presumptively rely on them, how-
ever, defendants should be protected from unreliable and unfair fact-
finding. Applying the Federal Rules of Evidence to guidelines sen-
tencing would be a significant step toward this goal.
I
SENTENCING WITHOUT EVIDENTIARY STANDARDS:
PAST AND PRESENT
The heightened importance of fact-finding at guidelines sentenc-
ing is inherent in the guidelines' structure. The court is required to
make factual determinations at sentencing.17 These specific fact de-
terminations have identifiable consequences because they determine
the prescribed sentencing range. Nothing in the Sentencing Reform
Act,'8 the guidelines, or other federal law imposes any substantial pro-
cedural protections for this fact-finding. 19 If Congress or the Commis-
sion had been drafting sentencing procedures on a clean slate, either
might have developed higher standards for evidence at sentencing.
Both Congress and the Commission deferred to courts, locating pro-
cedural rules as judicial matters. The courts, in turn, relied on pre-
guidelines sentencing procedures, despite questions about their origi-
nal validity and their appropriateness for guidelines sentencing.
(2d Cir. 1992) (Newman, J., concurring) (noting "the bizarre results that occasionally oc-
cur from a combination of the Sentencing Guidelines and the sentencing jurisprudence
that was developed prior to the Guidelines and is now applied to the Guidelines regime");
United States v. Galloway, 976 F.2d 414, 436 (8th Cir. 1992) (BrightJ., dissenting) (arguing
that in establishing constitutionality of the guidelines, pre-guidelines case law is inappo-
site); United States v. Davern, 970 F.2d 1490, 1501 (6th Cir. 1992) (Merritt, C.J., dissent-
ing) (protesting the overbroad reach of the relevant conduct guideline); United States v.
Harrington, 947 F.2d 956, 964 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (Edwards, J., concurring) (referring to the
guidelines as "a bit of a farce"); seeAlbertW. Alschuler, The Failure of Sentencing Guidelines: A
Plea for Less Aggregation, 58 U. CH. L. REv. 901 (1991); DanielJ. Freed, Federal Sentencing in
the Wake of Guidelines: Unacceptable Limits on the Discretion of Sentencers, 101 YALE LJ. 1681
(1992); Gerald W. Heaney, The Reality of Guidelines Sentencing: No End to Disparity, 28 AM.
CRim. L. Rnv. 161 (1991); Ilene H. Nagel & StephenJ. Schulhofer, A Tale of Three Cities: An
Empirical Study of Charging and Bargaining Practices Under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 66
S. CAL. L. REv. 501 (1992); Deborah Young, Untested Evidence: A Weak FoundationforSentenc-
ing, 5 FED. SENTENCING REP. 63 (1992); The Four Year U.S.S.C. & G.A.O. Impact Reports, 5
FED. SENTENCING REP. 122-83 (1992); Richard Husseini, Comment, The Federal Sentencing
Guidelines: Adopting Clear and Convincing Evidence as the Burden of Proof 57 U. CHi. L. REv.
1387 (1990); Steve Y. Koh, Note, Reestablishing the FederalJudge's Role in Sentencing 101 YALE
LJ. 1109 (1992).
17 U.S.S.G., supra note 10, § 6A1.3.
18 Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1987 (1984) (codified
as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 3551-3742 (1988), 28 U.S.C. §§ 991-98 (1988)).
19 See, e.g., U.S.S.G., supra note 10, § 6A1.3 (policy statement specifying that in resolv-
ing disputes, sentencing court may consider any relevant information so long as there are
"sufficient indicia of reliability to support its probable accuracy"); see also FED. R. CIuM. P.
32(a) (1) (noting that sentencing should not take place until factors in dispute are re-
solved, but failing to specify how to resolve these factors).
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The section first examines the history of sentencing in the United
States to discern why pre-guidelines sentencing employed such low ev-
identiary standards. The section then describes guidelines sentencing
and its lack of evidentiary standards.
A. The Evolution of Sentencing Without Evidence Standards
Initially, sentencing in the United States was determinate,20 so
there was no fact-finding at sentencing and consequently no need for
procedural standards for fact-finding. 21 Even when sentencing
evolved into indeterminate sentencing focused on rehabilitation, only
the most minimal standards were developed. 22 Because of the vast
discretion afforded judges under indeterminate sentencing, few de-
fendants could identify the impact of particular evidence or discern
the significance of low evidentiary standards. Consequently, such
standards could only be evaluated by assessing the validity of the rea-
sons given for those standards and theorizing about the importance of
low standards in the context of indeterminate sentencing.
The Supreme Court evaluated a sentence based on evidence that
would have been inadmissible at trial in Williams v. New York.23 The
Court affirmed the trial court's right to consider any evidence without
regard to rules of evidence.2 4 Despite weak analysis, 25 the Williams
case became the landmark decision on evidentiary standards at sen-
tencing. After determinate sentencing was reintroduced, the Court
revisited the issue. In McMillan v. Pennsylvania,26 the Court concluded
that preponderance of the evidence was an adequate burden of proof
for establishing a fact that invoked a mandatory minimum penalty.2 7
This section reviews how sentencing without significant eviden-
tiary standards evolved, and argues that the reasons given for low stan-
dards for evidence at pre-guidelines sentencing were ill-founded.
However, the vast discretion afforded judges, which made determin-
ing consequences difficult, did permit courts to ameliorate any ad-
20 Although the first colonies operated under criminaljustice systems that gave judges
more discretion, as laws and penalties were codified the colonies adopted a more rigid,
determinate system of sentencing. BRADLEY CHAPIN, CIMINAL JUSTICE IN COLONIAL
AMERICA 1606-1660 15-22 (1983).
21 Note, ProceduralDue Process at Judicial Sentencingfor Felony, 81 HARv. L. REv. 821, 822
(1968) [hereinafter Procedural Due Process] (stating that once a defendant was found guilty,
"[n]o further proceedings were necessary on the issue of quantum of punishment").
22 Sanford H. Kadish, Legal Norm and Discretion in the Police and Sentencing Processes, 75
HARV. L. Ruv. 904 (1962), reprinted in SANFORD H. KADISH, BLAME AND PUNISHMENT 243, 252
(1987).
23 337 U.S. 241 (1949).
24 I& at 251-52.
25 See discussion infra part I.A.2.
26 477 U.S. 79 (1986).
27 Id. at 91.
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verse impact on defendants from unreliable fact-finding. Because the
sentencing guidelines do not allow similar flexibility, the impact of
low evidentiary standards on defendants under guidelines sentencing
is harsher. The section concludes with a discussion of the procedural
law of sentencing under the guidelines.
1. Early American Sentencing and Procedure
The initial lack of procedural protection in sentencing is easy to
comprehend when one considers American sentencing history. When
the United States was colonized, sentences were definite and harsh.28
If a defendant was convicted of a felony, the statutorily mandated pen-
alty was often death, unless the defendant could offer a legal reason,
such as insanity or pregnancy,2 9 against the imposition of that pen-
alty.30 Thus, technically the court imposed the sentence, but the
court had no meaningful discretion once a defendant was convicted
of a felony. Neither the defendant's character nor prior criminal con-
duct was an issue.3 ' The legal reasons that excused punishment were
defined, and the court only had to make the factual determination of
whether the defendant fit one of the excused categories.
Despite the harshness of the prescribed penalties, the system con-
tained some opportunities for leniency. Ajury might find a defendant
guilty of a lesser crime in order to avoid the penalty of death.32 Par-
dons were also possible.33 Depending on the colony, the power to
pardon was vested in the executive, legislature or the court.34 Colo-
nies also adopted determined penalties other than death, such as
branding, whipping and the stocks,35 for many felonies. In 1682, Wil-
liam Penn introduced the concept of imprisonment at hard labor as
the punishment for many serious crimes.36 By the end of the seven-
teenth century the penitentiary had become an accepted, significant
part of criminal punishment.37
In contrast to felony statutes, statutes governing misdemeanor of-
fenses usually granted the court sentencing discretion, often allowing
a choice of either a fine or corporal punishment.38 Gradually, crimi-
28 Procedural Due Process, supra note 21, at 821-22.
29 Id. at 832-33.
30 Id.
31 Id.
32 SOL RUBIN, THE LAW OF CUMINAL CORRECrION 31 (2d ed. 1973).
33 ProceduralDue Process, supra note 21, at 822. One study of the period between 1631
and 1660 indicates that Massachusetts carried out fifteen death sentences. CHAPIN, supra
note 20, at 58.
34 CHAPIN, supra note 20, at 60.
35 RUBIN, supra note 32, at 26, 28.
36 Id. at 27-28.
37 Id. at 27-30.
38 Id. at 26.
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nal laws shifted toward providing more discretion to the sentencing
authority for all types of crimes. When Congress first legislated fed-
eral criminal laws, beginning in 1789, judges were often given discre-
tion in sentencing individuals convicted of misdemeanors and non-
capital felonies.3 9
In the early twentieth century, the concept of punishment as ret-
ribution was criticized, and the focus was shifted from the gravity of
the particular criminal act to the dangerousness of the offender. 40
Commentators argued that because the assessment of dangerousness
was beyond the ken of law alone, the establishment of boards of psy-
chologists or psychiatrists, sociologists, and lawyers should be estab-
lished to determine the correct treatment for a convicted criminal,
with the courts retaining opportunity to modify any sentence im-
posed.4' But the role of imposing an initial sentence, however inde-
terminate that sentence might be,42 was never transferred to boards of
experts.43 Instead, the concept was followed in the establishment of
parole boards and, accordingly, a "board of experts" did ultimately
determine the actual length of time served.44
39 Kate Stith & Steve Y. Koh, The Politics of Sentencing Reform: The Legislative History of
the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 28 WAKE Fop=sr L. REv. 223, 225 n.7 (1993).
40 Procedural Due Process, supra note 21, at 823-24.
41 Sheldon Glueck, Principles of a Rational Penal Code, 41 Hav. L. REv. 453, 462-63
(1928) ("Psychiatry, psychology, and social case work-not to mention those disciplines
more remotely connected with the problems of human motivation and behavior-must be
drawn into the program for administering criminal justice."); Matthew F. McGuire & Alex-
ander Holtzoff, The Problem of Sentence in the Criminal Law, 20 B.U. L. REv. 423, 432 (1940)
("[T]he imposition of sentence is ... a matter for administrative consideration by experts,
who by their peculiar training and experience are best able to reach a conclusion as to the
type and degree of treatment that is most likely to result successfully in respect to the
individual immediately concerned."); Comment, Reform in Federal Penal Procedure: The Fed-
eral Corrections and Parole Improvement Bills, 53 YAiE LJ. 773, 775 (1944) (hereinafter Reform
in Federal Penal Procedure) ("Because of the opportunity for error afforded by such broad
discretion . .. pre-sentence investigations were made available to trial judges under the
Federal Probation system, established in 1925.").
42 Some scholars believed that the sentencing reforms did not go far enough in their
reliance on experts instead of judges. Reform in Federal Penal Procedure, supra note 41, at
786-87. These scholars argued that parole boards, notjudges, should impose sentences or
prescribe the appropriate corrective treatments because such boards would make decisions
based "on scientific analysis of individual therapeutic needs." Id. at 786.
43 Although the majority of states today have initial sentences imposed by judges, a
few states have jury sentencing even in non-capital cases. ARTHuR W. CAmPBELL, L w OF
SENTENciNG 258 (2d ed. 1991). States that have jury sentencing in non-capital cases in-
clude Kentucky, Missouri, Oklahoma, Tennessee, and Texas. Id. at 258 n.32.
44 Chapter One of the guidelines notes that, "the pre-guidelines sentencing system...
required the court to impose an indeterminate sentence... and empowered the parole
commission to determine how much of the sentence an offender actually would serve in
prison." U.S.S.G., supra note 10, § 1A.3. Under this system, defendants generally only
served about one-third of the court-imposed sentence. Id.
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With discretionary, indeterminate sentencing, the courts tried to
tailor sentences to meet the goals of treatment and rehabilitation. 45
They increasingly considered a defendant's character, personal rela-
tionships, and individual abilities or disabilities in determining
sentences. Courts obtained information about defendants from pros-
ecutors, defense attorneys, and probation officers. By the early 1900s,
all states had indeterminate sentencing schemes 46 and by 1944 all
states had parole boards.41
During the rise of indeterminate sentencing, little discussion oc-
curred about the procedural protections afforded defendants at sen-
tencing proceedings.48 Instead, discussion focused on the substantive
transition to determinations of appropriate sentences for rehabilita-
tion.49 Notably, even as procedural protections for criminal defend-
ants increased, both pretrial and during trial, the lack of protection at
sentencing remained.50
2. The Landmark Case on Evidence Standards at Sentencing:
Williams v. New York
In 1948 the Supreme Court--held in Townsend v. Burke5' that the
due process clause guaranteed a defendant the right to be sentenced
based on accurate information. 52 Any hope that this decision would
lead to increased procedural protections for sentencing was dimin-
ished the following year, however, when the Court decided Williams v.
New York.53 New York law provided that before imposing sentence a
court had to consider the defendant's previous criminal record, any
reports of mental, psychiatric, or physical examinations, and any other
information that could aid the court in determining the proper treat-
45 The theory of indeterminate sentencing was that the criminal was morally sick and
could be rehabilitated. The time required for this rehabilitation, however, varied with the
individual. RICHARD G. SINGER, JUST DESERTS: SENTENCING BASED ON EQUALI-Y AND DESERT
1-2 (1979).
46 David J. Rothman, Sentencing Reforms in Historical Perspective, 29 CRIME & DELINQ.
631, 637 (1983).
47 RUBIN, supra note 32, at 622.
48 The 1957 edition of WHARTON'S CUMiNAL LAW AND PROCEDURE recognized that in
most capital cases the court had to allow the defendant to make any statement. RONALD A.
ANDERSON, WHARTON'S CRIMrNAL LAw AND PROCEDURE § 2181 (1957). Some courts also
imposed this rule in non-capital felonies, but the author deemed it unnecessary in misde-
meanors. Id.
49 McGuire & Holtzoff, supra note 41, at 423 (observing that in order to fashion an
appropriate sentence, the court should conduct a "thorough study ... of [the defendant's]
background, environment, training, education, and experience").
50 See infra notes 94-96.
51 334 U.S. 736 (1948).
52 Id. In Townsend, the Court overturned a sentence for failure to comply with due
process because at sentencing the lower court failed to distinguish prior arrests from prior
convictions and because the defendant was not represented by counsel.
53 337 U.S. 241 (1949).
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ment of the defendant.54 The court sentenced Williams to death, de-
spite a jury's recommendation of life imprisonment.55 At the
sentencing, the trial court commented on information from the
presentence report, which it considered in determining the sentence,
including information that the appellant had committed thirty other
burglaries, possessed "a morbid sexuality," and was a "menace to soci-
ety."56 The defendant argued on appeal that use of the presentence
report under the New York statute conflicted with the right of an indi-
vidual to be given reasonable notice of charges against him and an
opportunity to examine adverse witnesses, as guaranteed by the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.5 7
The Court rejected this argument, emphasizing that historically,
different evidentiary rules had been applied at trial and sentencing.58
The Court then considered practical reasons for the different proce-
dures at trial and sentencing. First, the Court stated that rules of evi-
dence at trial were designed to prevent consideration of collateral
issues and to avoid the possibility of a conviction resting on miscon-
duct other than that charged.59 In contrast, the judge at sentencing
needed a broad spectrum of information, particularly for individual-
ized sentencing with a goal of rehabilitation. 60 Second, the judge
needed to be able to rely on the presentence report.61 The Court
concluded that requiring the presentence report's information be
presented by testimony would cause undue delay.62
The Court decided that full access to information was necessary
for a judge's selection of the appropriate penalty because fashioning
appropriate individualized, indeterminate sentences required consid-
eration of an offender's past life and habits. 65 The Court approached
the problem as an all-or-nothing choice between the existing system,
permitting consideration of anything by the court, and the imposition
of complete trial procedures with all evidence at sentencing presented
by live witnesses subject to cross-examination. Fearing that formalized
trial-like procedures would exclude most of the information judges
54 Id. at 243.
55 Id. at 242.
56 I& at 244.
57 Id. at 245.
58 Id. at 246.
59 Id. at 247.
60 Id.
61 Id. at 246.
62 Id. at 250.
63 "Modern changes in the treatment of offenders make it more necessary now than a
century ago for observance of the distinctions in the evidential procedure in the trial and
sentencing processes. For indeterminate sentences and probation have resulted in an in-
crease in the discretionary powers exercised in fixing punishments." Id. at 248-49.
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relied on at sentencing,6 4 the Court concluded that the Due Process
Clause should not be applied to require that evidentiary procedure at
sentencing match trial procedure. 65
The Court justified its decision, in part, by pointing out that dis-
cretionary sentencing had not made "the lot of offenders harder."66
Despite its unwillingness to impose any procedural requirements, the
Court stated, without further explanation, that this opinion "is not to
be accepted as a holding that the sentencing procedure is immune
from scrutiny under the due process clause."67
Williams has been criticized recently for failing to meet current
constitutional standards.68 A close examination of Williams on its own
merits, however, reveals that the Court's assertions about sentencing
did not necessarily establish that evidentiary standards were inappro-
priate or unnecessary at sentencing. The Court relied heavily on the
long tradition of applying different standards of evidence at trial and
sentencing, without discussing how these different standards
originated. 69 The Court then asserted that the sentencing court
needed a broad range of information for rehabilitative sentencing,
should be able to rely on experts such as the presentence investiga-
64 Id. at 250.
65 Id. In dissent, Justice Murphy wrote that "[d]ue process of law includes at least the
idea that a person accused of crime shall be accorded a fair hearing through all the stages
of the proceedings against him." Id. at 253 (Murphy, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
Justice Murphy also noted that the sentencing judge changed Williams' jury sentence of
life imprisonment to death based on "a probation report, consisting almost entirely of
evidence that would have been inadmissible at... trial." Id. According to Justice Murphy,
the sentencing judge's consideration of whether to increase Williams' sentence should
have involved "the most scrupulous regard for the rights of the defendant." Id.
66 Id. at 249.
67 Id. at 252 n.18 (citing Townsend v. Burke, 334 U.S. 736 (1948)).
68 See, e.g., Susan N. Herman, Procedural Due Process in Guidelines Sentencing 4 FED. SEN.
TENCING REP. 295, 296 (1992). Herman argues that changes in the analysis of procedural
due process suggest that Williams should not apply today and that subsequent decisions
about the right to counsel at sentencing and the right to disclosure of the presentence
report undercut Williams. Id.
69 Williams, 337 U.S. at 246. For example, the Court failed to discuss the historical
reasons for not requiring evidentiary standards at sentencing. Once sentencing evolved
beyond determinate sentencing, such procedural protections might have been expected.
One historical explanation offered for the lack of procedural protections and evidentiary
standards at sentencing was the belief that any penalty less than the maximum was an act of
leniency, not an entitlement. Kadish, supra note 22, at 252. The force of this leniency
argument when the sentence imposed was branding rather than the death penalty is obvi-
ous, but even determinations of leniency may be more valid if founded on reliable evi-
dence. Furthermore, in Williams the Court was not moving toward a penalty less than the
maximum.
With the advent of the federal sentencing guidelines this leniency notion has been
unequivocally abandoned. Sentences are determined by the nature and seriousness of the
event, the defendant's criminal history, and other articulated sentencing factors. Unarticu-
lated leniency is not a basis for a reduction in sentence under the Guidelines. See inf-a
note 153 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 79:299310
FEDERAL SENTENCING
tors, could not apply evidentiary standards without great delay, and
that the loose sentencing scheme generally benefitted defendants.
Reexamining these reasons suggests that the Court's conclusion that
heightened evidentiary standards would be an impediment was ill-
founded.
The Court correctly stated that the imposition of a discretionary
sentence aimed at rehabilitation was premised both on knowing the
defendant's character and background and on predicting the defen-
dant's future behavior. In analyzing the need for particular evidence
at sentencing, however, the Williams Court did not distinguish be-
tween the kind of information a court needed for indeterminate sen-
tencing and the reliability of the form of the evidence. The
information the Court believed necessary for rehabilitative sentencing
included character evidence and prior crimes evidence. This kind of
information was generally excluded from trials because the evidence
was deemed unduly prejudicial in the decision of guilt or innocence, 70
not because the information was in a form deemed unreliable.
The Williams Court did not consider the different role of evi-
dence rules that excluded trial evidence because it was unreliable,
such as hearsay evidence. While a broad range of information was
critical for discretionary sentencing, and rightfully encompassed infor-
mation excluded in the guilt phase, such as prior crimes, the need for
such information did not mandate that every form of evidence be
accepted.
Applying rules of evidence based on the reliability of evidence,
such as the hearsay rules, would not limit the subject matter of the
information available to the sentencing court.71 Evidence of a defen-
dant's character and other attributes that might affect a determina-
tion of sentence under the rehabilitative model was not so unusual as
to make the application of evidentiary rules inappropriate. For exam-
ple, a defendant might want to present a letter attesting to the defen-
dant's good character from a former teacher or minister. Such
evidence would be objectionable on hearsay grounds. Any such objec-
tion could be easily overcome, however. First, the defendant could try
to obtain the government's agreement to admit the evidence.72 If that
70 Fmn. 1 Evm. 404 advisory committee's note. The two risks of prejudice to the
defendant are that the fact-finder might accord undue weight to evidence of the defen-
dant's bad character in the determination of guilt, and that the fact-finder might de-em-
phasize the risk of erroneously convicting the defendant because the character evidence
demonstrates that the defendant deserves to be punished. GRAHAM C. LiLuY, AN INTRODUC-
TION TO THE LAW OF EVIDENCE 109 (1978).
71 See discussion infra part IV.B.
72 Stipulations of evidence occur in two key ways. First, the parties may stipulate to
facts, thus agreeing the facts as stated are correct. Alternatively, the parties may stipulate to
expected testimony, thus agreeing only to what that person's testimony would be. EDWARD
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were unsuccessful, the defendant could have the witness come to
court.
The Williams Court identified the importance of the probation
officer's presentence report as another reason not to have evidentiary
rules. 78 The Court first pointed out that probation officers were try-
ing to aid offenders, not to prosecute. 74 The Court reasoned that
these reports were the best available information and without them
the courts would rely on guesswork and inadequate information. 75
However, the Court's reasoning was founded on the mistaken premise
of its earlier argument, that is, that the alternative to the presentence
report is no information. As with character evidence, it would be pos-
sible to obtain admissible evidence, relating to information in the
presentence report, that would be better evidence.
The Court voiced the concern that if trial courts could not rely
on presentence reports, sentencing hearings would become mini-tri-
als.76 As the hearsay example above recognizes, prohibiting the use of
J. ImwINKEIED, EVIDENTIARY FOUNDATIONS 235 (1980). The exact procedure to be fol-
lowed, such as whether the stipulation may be oral, varies among courts. Id.
73 A similar argument offered in support of not requiring evidence standards at dis-
cretionary sentencing was the need for social science evidence, particularly to assist the
court in predicting behavior. Glueck, supra note 41, at 462-63. The criminal justice system
viewed the use of psychological information as not susceptible to legal standards of proof.
Id. The imposition of a discretionary sentence was considered a diagnostic judgment by
experts, and therefore not appropriately subject to substantive and procedural restraints.
Id. Although this need for expert judgment is often cited as the reason for not imposing
procedural standards in discretionary sentencing, upon closer inspection the argument
seems invalid.
The difficulty in sentencing aimed at rehabilitation and treatment did not lay in find-
ing evidence that would meet common evidentiary standards. The difficulty was in evaluat-
ing and predicting human behavior. Attempts were made to determine how long someone
should be incarcerated in order to be rehabilitated. There never has been a consensus,
even among experts, about how to make such a decision. In sum, no evidence could
clearly identify an appropriate sentence. This certainly does not, however, lead to the con-
clusion that less reliable evidence should be admitted for consideration.
Psychological or behavioral information considered at sentencing is no more or less
susceptible to legal conclusions than other evidence, which is susceptible to different inter-
pretations and conclusions. At trial the rules of evidence impose evidentiary standards on
many types of scientific evidence, such as pathology reports. FED. R. Evil. 803(6). When
we believe that the evidence may not be readily interpreted by the fact finder, an expert
witness aids in the interpretation. FED. R EvID. 702-705. Courts do not abandon the stan-
dards of evidence because the nature of the evidence is scientific. See, e.g., Daubert v.
Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, 113 S. Ct. 2786, 2795 (1993) ("[T]he trial judge must ensure
that any and all scientific testimony or evidence admitted is not only relevant, but
reliable").
74 Williams, 337 U.S. at 249.
75 Id.
76 Under the guidelines, when an issue of the degree of guilt is deferred from the trial
phase to the sentencing phase, such as in determining relevant conduct, a "mini-trial" may
be appropriate. However, in most cases the imposition of evidentiary standards would not
make the sentencing proceeding less efficient. See discussion infra part IV. Moreover,
under the guidelines an increase in time for the sentencing proceeding seems warranted
312 [Vol. 79:299
4]FEDERAL SENTEWCINGV1
evidence that is inadmissible at trial could result in witnesses being
called at sentencing. Alternatively, courts could ignore second-hand
or unsubstantiated reports in determining sentences. Most likely,
however, higher evidentiary standards at discretionary sentencing
would have increased the expense of the proceeding, in terms of ef-
fort, time, and money. Accordingly, under a cost-benefit analysis,
there appeared to be systemic costs associated with adopting height-
ened evidentiary standards and no way to measure the benefit of such
evidence. 77
Although the Williams Court cited the trial court's discretion in
sentencing as a justification for a lack of procedural standards,78 the
Court did not articulate why this discretion reduced the problems of
unfairness and inconsistency generated by low standards for reliability
of evidence. Generally, sentencing discretion refers to a court's right
to impose any sentence within the statutory parameters. For most fed-
eral offenses, the parameters ranged from probation to a maximum
sentence of five years incarceration;79 for more serious offenses the
range was from probation to ten years incarceration, or even to life
imprisonment.80 Under this sentencing system, there was no identifi-
able impact of any specific factor, such as the amount of money em-
bezzled, on the actual sentence. Whether the defendant embezzled
$500 or $500,000 ajudge could sentence the defendant to probation
or to any period of imprisonment up to ten years.8 '
Judges had discretion to decide the goal for sentencing a particu-
lar defendant, the facts relevant to that goal, and the ultimate sen-
tence. 2 This vast discretion meant that judges could take into
by Congress' goal of increasing the fairness and consistency of sentences. With discretion-
ary sentencing, because there was no requirement that a given fact have a certain conse-
quence, the need for accurate fact-finding was less compelling.
77 Current due process analysis incorporates consideration of increased administra-
tive burdens from new procedural protections into the balancing test. See infra note 126
and accompanying text.
78 Williams, 337 U.S. at 247.
79 See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (1988 & Supp. 1992) (mail fraud).
80 See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 2113 (1988) (bank robbery).
81 The only distinction in penalty for most federal crimes was between a misdemeanor
and a felony. For example, in the case of embezzlement of public funds, embezzlement of
$100 or less would have constituted a misdemeanor, punishable by a maximum of one year
in jail and $1,000 fine. 18 U.S.C. § 641 (1988) (embezzlement of public money, property,
or records).
82 Stanton Wheeler, Kenneth Mann, and Austin Sarat conducted extensive interviews
of federal judges in 1978-1980 to learn how they sentenced white-collar criminals.
Deborah Young, Federal Sentencing. Looking Back to Move Forward, 60 U. GIN. L. Rxv. 135
(1991) (reviewing STANTON WHEELER Er AL., SITrING IN JUDGMENT. THE SENTENCING OF
WHIrE-CoLLAR CRIMINALS (1988)) [hereinafter Young, Looking Back to Move Forward].
Wheeler and his colleagues concluded that sentencing occurred in two stages. Firstjudges
evaluated the seriousness of the offense; then they translated that determination into an
actual sentence. Id. at 169-70. The first stage entailed evaluating the harm caused, deter-
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account characteristics of the offense, the defendant's personal char-
acteristics, the victim's characteristics, and even community senti-
ment.83 Consequently, all sorts of evidence might be relevant. Courts
could evaluate speculative issues such as the defendant's character
and the likelihood of recurrent criminal behavior. Courts could con-
sider the impact of a particular sentence on the community as a
whole, or on the defendant's immediate family.
A defendant might present past achievements in education and
employment, relationship to the community, and relationship to fam-
ily. Evidence of these factors often was simply an oral summary by
defense counsel at sentencing. Letters of support for the defendant
from family, employers, or neighbors were common. Ongoing re-
sponsibilities of the defendant that would be impeded by incarcera-
tion were also brought to the attention of the court, particularly the
need to support a family by continued employment. Because there
were no limits on what a court could choose to consider as a basis for
sentencing, anecdotal evidence on any topic could be presented.
The prosecution also relied on anecdotal evidence, commonly to
show the defendant's other past transgressions, including previously
uncharged conduct. The prosecution might also describe the terrible
crime or drug or fraud problem in America and the outrageous part
this defendant had played in the great crime wave. Because the judge
could seize on any aspect of information presented, without even ac-
knowledging it, and adjust a sentence, prosecutors and defendants
brought in a wide array of evidence hoping something would favora-
bly influence the judge.
Although the vast discretion exercised by courts did not obviate
the need for procedural protections, it did allow courts to avoid some
of the most unjust consequences that now occur under guidelines sen-
tencing. At pre-guidelines sentencing a court could ameliorate any
lack of reliability by weighting the trustworthiness of the evidence.
When a court 'Judged" a sentence in the traditional sense of authori-
tatively deciding the sentence, the court was not required to make any
factual determinations. When the court did receive factual informa-
tion, the court could weight that information as it chose.8 4 Assessing
mining the blameworthiness of the defendant, and predicting the consequence of a sen-
tence. Id. at 169. Wheeler and his colleagues found that judges substantially agreed on the
relative seriousness of offenses. Id. at 173-74. Disparity in discretionary sentencing arose in
the second stage, translating the assessment of seriousness into the actual sentence.
83 WHEELER ET AL., supra note 82, at 54.
84 This analysis was stimulated by Wheeler, Mann and Sarat's discussion of howjudges
weight different sentencing factors. By weighting the authors mean determining a factor's
significance in deciding the sentence. For example, the authors make a distinction be-
tween measuring the amount of harm--such as the amount of money embezzled-and
determining how much that amount of harm should count in the pre-guidelines sentenc-
ing decision. Id. at 168-70.
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the facts and assigning their relative weights was fundamental to the
sentencing judge's discretionary authority. Critics of the system, how-
ever, charged that different judges weighted different items of infor-
mation differently, so that like individuals could receive unlike
sentences.8 5 The sentencing guidelines remove this discretion and
weight individual factors by determining how many points each factor
should receive.8 6
One of the generally unacknowledged merits of the discretionary
sentencing system was that it permitted judges to weight evidence
based on its reliability. For example, a judge might have two cases in
which there was an allegation of substantial drug sales over a period of
time. In one case, the evidence of this might be direct testimony by
an eyewitness. In the other case, the evidence of this might be hearsay
testimony by a government agent of what an unidentified informer
had said. The judge could impose a harsher sentence in the first case
because of the degree of certainty of the alleged conduct. In the sec-
ond case, with much less reliable evidence, the court could impose a
more lenient sentence, to reflect the much lower probability that the
information was correct. Despite this vast discretion to weight evi-
dence, courts rarely mentioned it, because there was no requirement
that they justify particular sentences.
The Williams Court did not explicitly state why it believed that
discretion at sentencing required the use of evidence that did not
meet admissibility standards. But the Court implied that the need for
a broad range of information, rather than a court's ability to adjust a
sentence according to the reliability of the evidence, mandated the
Court's holding.8 7
A final reason the Williams Court gave for not imposing stricter
procedural standards was that the indeterminate sentencing scheme
without evidentiary standards generally benefitted offenders.88 This
must have seemed ironic to Williams, whose sentence was changed
from the jury's recommendation of life imprisonment to the judge's
determination of the death penalty. But the Court's argument does
highlight one reason that there was not a louder call for procedural
reform of sentencing: there was no clear constituency for change.
Defendants were as likely to obtain an advantage as prosecutors in
presenting "highly colored" statements of fact.8 9 With the inability to
85 Id. at 10.
86 The Federal Sentencing Guidelines delineate the presumptive impact of a given
factor, such as the type of crime, the degree of harm, and the characteristics of the victim.
U.S.S.G., supra note 10, §§ 2AL.1-3AL.3.
87 Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 247, 251-52 (1949).
88 Id. at 249.
89 In the mid-1940s, a Sixth Circuit judge observed that a sentencing court "had few
real facts before it upon which to base its judgment." McGuire & Holtzoff, supra note 41,
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determine what the judge might consider important, both defendants
and prosecutors took a "kitchen sink" approach to sentencing, trying
to mention every possible favorable fact or issue in the hope that the
judge would be moved by one of them. Because courts could consider
any aspect of the defendant's personal life at sentencing, defendants
could be the beneficiaries of open evidence standards.90
Another key reason why the issue of low evidentiary standards at
discretionary sentencing was not raised more frequently was that the
impact of a specific item of evidence was rarely apparent. The reason-
ing behind discretionary sentencing was usually done privately.
Although the prosecutor, defense attorney, and defendant had an op-
portunity to speak at a sentencing hearing, the court was not required
to respond in any way. The court could simply pronounce the sen-
tence. When the court gave no explanation, it was impossible to
demonstrate the specific effect on sentencing of the use of informal,
unreliable evidence. Moreover, there was no basis for appeal, other
than imposition of an illegal sentence. 91
Despite its weak foundation, the Williams ruling has been consist-
ently followed. Williams has been cited repeatedly for the proposition
that sentencing courts should be allowed to consider any information
in any evidentiary form. 92 The principle of Williams was subsequently
codified in 1970 in 18 U.S.C. § 3577 with the language:
No limitation shall be placed on the information concerning
the background, character, and conduct of a person convicted of an
offense which a court of the United States may receive and consider
for the purpose of imposing an appropriate sentence.93
The durability of Williams stands out amidst the significant devel-
opment of increased procedural protections for criminal suspects and
defendants, which began during the mid-twentieth century. Many of
the basic procedural protections, such as the right to counsel, were
promulgated in the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure in 1946.94
Some of these rights, such as the right to counsel, were subsequently
at 424 (quotingJudge Florence Allen). Judge Allen also noted that the court routinely
received "highly colored" statements of fact from both the government and the defense
counsel. Id.
90 In contrast, under the guidelines personal history characteristics have much less
impact on a sentence. See discussion infra part I.B.
91 See, e.g., United States v. Fessler, 453 F.2d 953, 954 (3d Cir. 1972).
92 See, e.g., United States v. Wise, 976 F.2d 393, 399 (8th Cir. 1992).
93 This was originally codified as 18 U.S.C. § 3577 in 1970. The Sentencing Reform
Act of 1984, 98 Stat. 1987, renumbered the provision as 18 U.S.C. § 3661.
94 The Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, as enacted in 1946, contained wide-rang-
ing provisions governing warrants for arrests and searches, joinder of defendants, pre-trial
motions practice, venue, presentence reports and appeals. U.S. CODE CONG. SERV. 2275
(West 1946).
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recognized as constitutionally required. 95 Other protections were es-
tablished by both statute and case law in the ensuing decades.96 In
1976, the Federal Rules of Evidence were adopted to codify the evi-
dentiary rules to be applied at all federal trials, both jury and non-
jury.97 These rules were not extended to sentencing, however. 98
Wide acceptance of Williams effectively closed the door to court
challenges to the reliability of evidence at sentencing. As long as a
judge had discretion to sentence within statutory parameters, there
was no restriction on the type of evidence the judge could consider.
In the 1959 case of Williams v. Oklahoma,99 the Court again permitted
the use of hearsay evidence at sentencing, this time provided orally by
the prosecutor rather than in a written presentence report.100 Be-
cause the defendant had conceded that the prosecutor's statements
were correct, there was no question of reliability. 101
Circuit courts eventually addressed the question of the reliability
of hearsay used at sentencing. In United States v. Weston,102 the Ninth
Circuit reviewed a sentence in which the court had relied on the opin-
ions of unidentified bureau personnel and the unsubstantiated state-
ments made by federal drug agents to the probation officer that the
defendant was a large scale heroin dealer.10 3 The court concluded
that the probative value of this evidence was "almost nil"'0 4 and that "a
sentence cannot be predicated on information of so little value as that
here involved." 10 5 Other courts subsequently interpreted the holding
in Weston to require some minimal indicia of reliability for hearsay
evidence considered at sentencing.106 "Minimal indicia of reliability"
thus became the standard for assessing hearsay evidence at pre-guide-
lines discretionary sentencing.10 7
95 Mempha v. Rhay, 389 U.S. 128 (1967).
96 For example, the timing of criminal prosecutions was governed by the Speedy Trial
Act, 88 Stat. 2076 (1974) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 3152-56, 3161-74; 28 U.S.G.
§ 604); the disclosure of exculpatory information was controlled by Brady v. United States,
397 U.S. 742 (1970); the disclosure of statements by government witnesses was limited by
the Jencks Act, 84 Stat. 926 (1970) (current version at 18 U.S.C. § 3500), and the eliciting
of confessions was circumscribed by Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), and its
progeny.
97 FED. R. EvID. 1101.
98 FED. R. EVID. 1101(d) (3).
99 358 U.S. 576 (1959).
100 Id. at 576.
101 Id. at 584.
102 448 F.2d 626 (9th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1061 (1972).
103 Id. at 628.
104 Id. at 633.
105 Id. at 634.
106 See, e.g., United States v. Baylin, 696 F.2d 1030, 1039-40 (3d Cir. 1982).
107 As discussed infra part IIA, this standard remains in effect under guidelines
sentencing.
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In 1967, the Supreme Court considered the application of the
due process clause to fact-finding at sentencing. In Specht v. Patter-
son,10 8 the Court reviewed a Colorado statute which provided that a
defendant convicted for indecent liberties, with a penalty maximum
of ten years, could be sentenced under a sex offenders act.10 9 The sex
offenders act provided for an indeterminate prison term of one day to
life if the court found that the defendant constituted a threat of bodily
harm, or was an habitual offender and mentally ill.110 The statute per-
mitted the court to reach that conclusion after reviewing a psychiatric
report, without any hearing or confrontation by the defendant."'
The Court held that the requirements of due process were not satis-
fied because the sentencing involved making a new finding of fact that.
was not an ingredient of the offense charged."12 Due process re-
quired that this defendant have an opportunity to be heard, to con-
front and cross-examine witnesses, and to offer evidence. 113 The
Court did not discuss what burden of proof should apply.
3. The Landmark Case for Preponderance of the Evidence at
Sentencing: McMillan v. Pennsylvania
Even as indeterminate sentencing became entrenched in the
American legal system, some judges and scholars began to question
the wisdom of such vast discretion in sentencing, probation, and pa-
role decisions. 114 Even before indeterminate sentencing had been
adopted nationwide, critics argued that there was unfair disparity
among similar defendants in different courts."15 Concerns about dis-
parity led to calls for reform of sentencing through the creation of
guidelines. 116 Congress and some state legislatures responded with
determinate sentencing statutes. 117
108 386 U.S. 605 (1967).
109 Id. at 607.
110 Id.
III ad at 608.
112 Id. at 608-11.
113 Id. at 610.
114 See, e.g., Kadish, supra note 22, at 250 ("[T]he new penology has resulted in vesting
in judges and parole and probation agencies the greatest degree of uncontrolled power
over the liberty of human beings that one can find in the legal system.").
115 For a list of articles expressing concerns about sentencing disparity, see supra note
2.
116 Other sentencing reforms were also suggested, such as the use of appellate review
of sentences. The Supreme Court disapproved of this suggestion in Dorszynski v. United
States, 418 U.S. 424 (1974).
117 For a summary of the history of mandatory minimum penalties in the United
States, see UNITED STATES SENTENCING COMM'N, SPECIAL REPORT TO THE CONGRESS:
MANDATORY MINIMUM PENALTIES IN THE FEDERAL CRIMINALJUSTICE SYSTEM (1991) [hereinaf-
ter MANDATORY MINIMUM PENALTIES]. Determinate sentences had previously existed in the
United States, beginning with mandatory capital punishment for specified crimes in the
late eighteenth century. Id. at 5. Determinate sentences for drug offenses were adopted by
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In 1984, Congress began adopting numerous statutes with
mandatory minimum sentences for drug and weapons offenses. 118
Mandatory minimum sentences require a judge to sentence a defen-
dant to a period of incarceration based on the quantity of drugs or the
possession of a weapon despite any other characteristics of the crime,
the defendant's degree of involvement, or the likelihood of
rehabilitation." 9
Although these mandatory minimums generated a great deal of
controversy, the concern focused on the appropriateness of non-dis-
cretionary sentencing according to quantity or a single offense charac-
teristic, in lieu of a totality of the circumstances view of sentencing. 20
Mandatory minimum legislation imposed a more ministerial role on
federal judges in sentencing. Once the government established the
quantity or other controlling factor, the judge identified the
mandatory minimum and then was limited to exercising traditional
sentencing discretion by increasing the sentence.
The quantity of the drug or presence of a weapon could be
charged in the indictment and either proved at trial, as demonstrated
by the jury verdict, or admitted in a guilty plea.' 2 ' In such cases, be-
cause the judge did not assume a new fact-finding role, concerns
Congress in 1956, but repealed in 1970 when they did not appear to decrease criminal
activity. Id. at 6. In 1984, Congress again began adopting mandatory minimum penalties.
Id. at 8. For a comprehensive compilation of state sentencing reform as of 1985, see NA-
TIONAL INSTruTE OF JUSTICE, SENTENCING REFORM IN THE UNITED STATES: HIsToRY, CON-
TENT, AND Eyrr (1985).
118 From 1984, the year Congress authorized the Federal Sentencing Guidelines,
through 1990, additional mandatory minimum penalties were adopted every two years.
MANDATORY MINIMUM PENALTIES, supra note 117, at 8.
119 For example, current federal mandatory minimum sentences are imposed for, inter
alia, distribution or possession with intent to distribute certain quantities of drugs and for
the use ofa weapon in the commission of a crime of violence or drug trafficking. 21 U.S.C.
§ 841 (1992); 18 U.S.C. § 924 (1992).
120 See, e.g., United States v. Klein, 860 F.2d 1489, 1501 (9th Cir. 1988) (upholding
constitutionality of defendant's mandatory minimum sentence but observing that
mandatory minimums gave less attention to judicial gradation and discretion). Under sen-
tencing guidelines, courts continue to express dismay over their inability to adjust
sentences for factors other than the quantity of drugs. In the course of one sentencing
proceeding involving a defendant who had been employed for twenty-four years and never
been involved in crime before, Judge Schwarzer of the Northern District of California
noted that the evidence clearly established that defendant was found with a bag of crack
cocaine in his vehicle. United States v. Anderson, Cr. No. 88-804 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 15,
1989), Excerpt from Transcript reprinted in 2 FED. SENTENCING REP. 185, 186 (1990). Due
to the mandatory minimum for this offense,Judge Schwarzer stated that he was compelled
to give a ten year sentence but complained that this sentence "did anything but serve jus-
tice." Id. at 186. Judge Schwarzer described mandatory minimums as "computers automat-
ically imposing sentences without regard to what isjust and right, and when that is allowed
to happen, the rule of law is drained of the semblance ofjustice." Id.
121 FED. R. CrM. P. 11.
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about procedural safeguards ensuring that the defendant had in fact
sold the quantity alleged in the charge did not arise.122
When a court did have to determine facts at the sentencing phase
that would invoke a mandatory sentence, concerns about both the re-
liability of evidence and the burden of proof arose. In the 1986 case
of McMillan v. Pennsylvania,123 the Supreme Court addressed the issue
of burden of proof at a state mandatory minimum sentencing pro-
ceeding. McMillan challenged the constitutionality of a Pennsylvania
law that provided a minimum sentence of five years of imprisonment
for specified felonies if the sentencing judge found, by a preponder-
ance of the evidence, that the defendant visibly possessed a firearm
during the commission of the felony.' 24 The trial court found the act
unconstitutional, but the Pennsylvania Supreme Court reversed.' 25
McMillan argued that visible possession of a firearm was an ele-
ment of the offense and thus should be proved beyond a reasonable
doubt and, in the alternative, that even if visible possession was not an
element of the offense, due process required a higher burden of
proof than a preponderance of the evidence. 126 In McMillan, the ma-
jority held that Pennsylvania's delineation of "visible possession of a
firearm" as a sentencing factor subject to the preponderance of evi-
dence standard did not violate the due process clause.' 27 The Court
emphasized that under Patterson v. New York128 states had discretion,
although not unlimited, to designate factors as sentencing factors
rather than elements of the offense. 129 The Pennsylvania statute only
122 Even when there were no fact determinations to be made by the judge, mandatory
minimum sentencing dramatically changed sentencing hearings. In many cases,
mandatory sentencing left nothing to be said. The defense attorney often was aware that
the mandatory minimum penalty was substantially more than the particular judge would
have given a similar defendant in the past, so there was no fear of a higher sentence.
Because of the mandatory minimum there was no chance of a lower sentence, so there was
no incentive to expound on the rehabilitative potential of the defendant. Likewise, the
prosecutor did not expect the judge to give more than the mandatory minimum, and may
even have thought less was appropriate. Hearings often were perfunctory, ending with the
judge explaining to the defendant, sometimes with apologies, why the particular sentence
had to be imposed. See supra note 120.
123 477 U.S. 79 (1986).
124 Id. at 81.
125 Id. at 82-83.
126 By 1986 the Supreme Court was using a two-stage analysis for due process. Id. at 83.
This test was first delineated in Matthews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976). In the first part
of the test, the court would determine whether the claimant had a property or liberty
interest protected by the Due Process clause. Id. If so, in the second part of the analysis,
the court would balance the private interest that would be affected by official action, the
risk of erroneous deprivation of the interest and the probable value of any additional safe-
guards, and the government interest, including the administrative burdens associated with
additional safeguards. Id. at 335.
127 McMillan, 477 U.S. at 91.
128 432 U.S. 197 (1977).
129 477 U.S. at 85.
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limited the court's discretion in selecting a penalty within the existing
range. In the Court's estimation, the statute was not a case of a "tail
which wags the dog."' 30
After concluding that visible possession of a firearm could be des-
ignated as a sentencing consideration, the majority perfunctorily con-
cluded that the preponderance of the evidence standard satisfied due
process. The Court relied on the tradition of sentencing "without any
prescribed burden of proof at all," citing Williams v. New York,
although the Williams opinion never mentioned burden of proof.'3 '
Justice Stevens, in dissent, strongly disagreed with the wide discre-
tion given to states in the majority opinion. 3 2 He argued that be-
cause the Pennsylvania statute prohibited conduct for which
conviction mandated a special punishment, proof beyond a reason-
able doubt should be required. 3 3 He found the conduct of visibly
possessing a firearm to be an element of the offense, despite the
Pennsylvania nomenclature of a sentencing factor. 34
Mandatory minimum statutes, such as the one at issue in McMil-
lan, previewed the sentencing guidelines in three key respects. First,
the mandatory minimums were a harbinger of sentencing decisions
focused on harm-or the easiest indicator of harm-rather than on
mens rea or rehabilitative potential. With mandatory minimums, the
extent of the offense was the single controlling factor in most sentenc-
ing decisions.'35 Despite the judiciary's growing concerns about the
subjective fairness of mandatory minimums, 3 6 harsher sentences for
drug offenders were popular politically as evidence of the war on
drugs.'37 Second, the guidelines were drafted to reflect existing
mandatory minimum sentences. 38 For example, the guideline for
distributing half a kilogram of cocaine encompassed the mandatory
minimum of sixty months for distributing half a kilogram of co-
caine.'3 9 Finally, this intermediate stage of quantity based sentencing
without adequate procedures for fact-finding provided a transition to
fact determined sentencing without improved procedural protections.
130 Id. at 88.
131 Id. at 91 (citing Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241 (1949)).
132 Id. at 95-104 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
133 Id. at 96.
'34 Id.
135 For drug offenses, for example, the quantity of drugs was the controlling factor.
U.S.S.G., supra note 10, § 2D1.
136 See supra note 120.
137 See, e.g., Voters' Unrest Overrode Doubts About Sentencing Law, WAsH. POs-r, May
11, 1986, at A14 (reporting voter approval of mandatory minimum laws in response to
growing public unrest over drug sales).
138 MANDATORY MnriMtm PENALTiES, supra note 117, at 20, 29.
139 U.S.S.G., supra note 10, § 2DI.1(8).
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The federal sentencing guidelines were being drafted when Mc-
Millan was decided. In passing the Sentencing Reform Act, Congress
had given little attention to the procedural aspects of sentencing
other than the right of appellate review.140 The only reference to evi-
dentiary standards was the recodification of 18 U.S.C. § 3577.141 The
act does not mention the burden of proof. In drafting the guidelines,
the Sentencing Commission did not mandate either the appropriate
standard of proof or who would have that burden. 142 The Commis-
sion left these matters for the courts.' 43
B. The Lack of Evidentiary Standards in the Guidelines
The guidelines present as radical a change from discretionary
sentencing as did the emergence of rehabilitative sentencing at the
end of the nineteenth century. This change is not necessarily demon-
strated by outcomes in individual cases, however. A defendant may
receive the same sentence under the guidelines as at pre-guidelines
sentencing. 44 The radical change of the guidelines is demonstrated
by what functions judges must carry out to impose sentences and by
what factors now determine a sentence. 145
When judges sentenced under discretionary sentencing, they
were only required to decide sentences, as an exercise of pure discre-
tion, within the statutorily permissible range. Judges did not have to
make factual determinations or to convert factual determinations into
months in jail. Judges were not required to assess explicitly the relia-
bility of any evidence or rule on its admissibility. Judges could weight
evidence according to its reliability or choose to ignore it. They had
discretion in both what the final sentence would be and how to deter-
mine that sentence.' 46 The sentencing function matched the classic
definition of judging: authoritatively deciding the issue.' 47
140 18 U.S.C. § 3742 (1985 & Supp. 1993).
141 This provision was recodified as 18 U.S.C. § 3661 in the 1984 Sentencing Reform
Act.
142 See supra note 10.
143 See infra notes 193-97 and accompanying text.
144 The United States Sentencing Commission said it designed the guidelines to result
in defendants' receiving, on average, substantially the same sentences they would have re-
ceived under pre-guidelines sentencing. Breyer, supra note 4, at 7. However, studies indi-
cate that sentences have increased for many types of crimes. Theresa W. Karle & Thomas
Sager, Are the Federal Sentencing Guidelines Meeting Congressional Goals?: Empirical and Case
Law Analysis, 40 EMORy LJ. 393, 415-16 (1991).
145 The guidelines are phrased as affirmative directives, such as considering specific
factors in determining the level of art offense. By stating what judges must do in passing
sentence and limiting discretion, the guidelines also effectively dictate what judges may not
do, such as determining the weight of factors as they could under pre-guidelines
sentencing.
146 See supra notes 82-86 and accompanying text.
147 THE RANDOM HOUSE COLLEGE DICTIONARY 724 (rev. ed. 1980).
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The sentencing guidelines now require ajudge to perform three
distinct functions. First, the judge must make factual determina-
tions.148 Even when the defendant has been convicted by ajury, the
judge is not bound by the jury's factual determinations. 149 The judge
must independently decide the defendant's culpability and role in the
offense. Second, after deciding the facts required by the guidelines,
the judge must perform the ministerial function of calculating the
sentencing range based on the factual determinations. 150 Third, once
the judge identifies the appropriate guidelines range, the judge
assumes the traditional function of actually determining the
sentence. 151 At this point, the guidelines impose an additional, signif-
icant constraint.' 52 If the sentence chosen is not within the guideline
range, the judge mustjustify the departure from that range. 153
In addition to prescribing ajudge's sentencing functions, the sec-
ond fundamental change of the guidelines is the establishment of two
basic determinants of a sentence: the offense level and the criminal
history category. Once a defendant's offense level and criminal his-
tory category are established, the court must consider whether any fac-
tors exist that warrant adjustments or departures. With each of these
determinations the court must make specific findings of fact. Each of
these determinations of fact is then calculated into the equation that
defines the parameters of the judge's limited discretion. Considering
the factors to be assessed in evaluating offense levels, criminal history
148 U.S.S.G., supra note 10, § 6AI.3.
149 For examples of cases in which the judge sentenced based on a different set of facts
than the jury had found, see infra note 251.
150 The guidelines provide a step-by-step overview of how to determine the proper
sentencing range. First, the judge selects the applicable offense guideline section from
Chapter Two, Offense Conduct. U.S.S.G., supra note 10, § 1B1.1 (a). Second, after deter-
mining the base offense level, any applicable specific offense characteristics are added. Id.
at § 1B1.1 (b). Third, the offense level is adjusted in accordance with Chapter Three, Ad-
justments. Id. at § 1B1.1 (c). These three steps are repeated if there are multiple counts of
conviction. Id. at § 1B11(d). The base offense level then is adjusted if the defendant
accepted responsibility as defined by § 3E. Id. at § 1B1.1(e). Next, the defendant's crimi-
nal history category is determined along with any applicable adjustments mandated by
§ 4B. Id. at § 1B1.1 (f). Section 5A then supplies the correct guideline range based on the
defendant's offense level and criminal history category. Id. at § 1B1.1(g).
151 Id. at § 1B1.4.
152 This outline of guidelines sentencing is consistent with the application instructions
in the guidelines. Id. at § IB1.1. Marc Miller and Daniel J. Freed have argued that this
sequence is inconsistent with the authorizing legislation. Marc Miller & Daniel J. Freed,
Honoring Judicial Discretion Under the Sentencing Reform Act, 3 FED. SENTENCING REP. 235
(1991). They suggest thatjudges should fact-find, identify purposes for the sentence, con-
sider sentencing options, and only then consider the range recommended by the
guidelines.
153 In the introduction to the guidelines, the Commission states that a sentencing
court may depart only in an "atypical case.., where conduct significantly differs from the
norm...." U.S.S.G., supra note 10, § 1A4(b) (policy statement).
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categories, and adjustments and departures highlights the importance
of accurate fact-finding.
The initial basic determinant is the offense level. An offense level
is established by the category of the crime 54 and the amount of harm
inflicted. 155 The elements of the offense identify the appropriate cate-
gory of the crime. Within each category, specified factors determine
the degree of harm or severity of offense. To a large extent the guide-
lines have adopted easily quantifiable measurements of harm. For
drug distribution crimes, the primary factors delineating the offense
level are the type and quantity of the drug.156 For crimes involving
theft of money, the primary determinant of the offense level is the
quantity of money stolen. 157 For example, if a business employee em-
bezzles $15,000, the base offense level will be four out of a possible
forty-three levels for embezzlement plus five levels for the "specific
offense characteristic" of taking an amount over $10,000. Thus, the
total offense level is nine. If more money is embezzled, the offense
level will be higher, directly representing the increased harm. These
specific factual determinations of degree of harm have a direct impact
on the sentence imposed. A determination of a larger quantity of
drugs in a distribution case or money in an embezzlement case raises
the parameters of the potential legal sentence. Thus, in sharp con-
trast to pre-guidelines sentencing, the importance of a single factual
finding at guidelines sentencing is readily ascertained and directly in-
fluences the sentence. s58
A critical component of the offense level determination is the
concept of sentencing the defendant based on all relevant conduct.159
At the sentencing phase the court must make factual findings about
all of the defendant's known criminal conduct. The court is not
154 There is not a separate guideline for each federal crime. For example, a variety of
crimes concerning theft and other property offenses under 18 U.S.C. §§ 641, 656, 657, 659,
1702, 1708, 2113(b), 2312, and 2317 are sentenced according to one guideline, U.S.S.G.,
supra note 10, § 2Bl.1.
155 For further discussion of how the guidelines incorporate the traditional assessment
of harm at sentencing, see Young, Looking Back to Move Forward, supra note 82, at 145-46.
156 U.S.S.G., supra note 10, § 2D1.1.
157 U.S.S.G., supra note 10, § 2B1.1.
158 At pre-guidelines sentencing, ajudge could impose a sentence because of a specific
fact and the judge could identify that specific factor as the basis of the sentence, but
neither was required. See discussion supra part I.A.
159 U.S.S.G., supra note 10, § 1B1.3. For a thorough explanation of the relevant con-
duct guideline, see William W. Wilkins,Jr. &John R_ Steer, Relevant Conduct: The Cornerstone
of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, S.C. L. Rav. 495 (1990). The relevant conduct guideline
has been the subject of extensive criticism. See, e.g., United States v. Galloway, 976 F.2d
414, 428 (8th Cir. 1992) (BrightJ, dissenting), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1420 (1993); United
States v. Silverman, 976 F.2d 1502, 1519 (6th Cir. 1991) (Merritt, CJ., dissenting), cert.
denied, 113 S. Ct. 1595 (1993); Freed, supra note 16, at 1712-14.
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bound by what the defendant admitted in a plea of guilty160 or by
what ajury found at trial.161 For example, a prosecutor may have cho-
sen to try an individual for distributing two kilograms of cocaine be-
cause that was readily provable. Before, during, or after trial, the
prosecutor may have discovered additional evidence of drug distribu-
tion by the defendant. If this evidence was not admissible at trial be-
cause the source was hearsay, the defendant may nevertheless be
sentenced based on that evidence.
Factual determinations made under the relevant conduct inquiry
can dramatically increase a defendant's sentence. Consider the case
of a defendant who has pleaded guilty or been convicted of distribut-
ing two kilograms of cocaine. At the sentencing phase, the prosecu-
tion may contend that the defendant in fact distributed twenty
kilograms of cocaine. The court must make this factual determina-
tion. 162 If the court determines that the defendant probably did dis-
tribute twenty kilograms of cocaine, then the defendant's offense level
160 Courts routinely consider counts dismissed as part of a plea agreement in calculat-
ing the defendant's sentence if the counts are part of the same course of conduct to which
the defendant pleaded guilty. See United States v. Frierson, 945 F.2d 650, 653-55 (3d Cir.
1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1515 (1992); United States v. Smallwood, 920 F.2d 1231, 1239
(5th Cir. 1991), cert. deniea, 111 S. Ct. 2870 (1991); United States v. Rodriguez-Nuez, 919
F.2d 461, 464-65 (7th Cir. 1990); United States v. Williams, 880 F.2d 804, 805-06 (4th Cir.
1989); United States v. Scroggins, 880 F.2d 1204, 1213-14 (11th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 494
U.S. 1083 (1990); United States v. Wright, 873 F.2d 437, 440-41 (1st Cir. 1989); United
States v. Sailes, 872 F.2d 735, 738-39 (6th Cir. 1989).
The policy statement in the guidelines states that the court is not bound by the par-
ties' stipulation contained in the plea agreement. U.S.S.G., supra note 10, § 6B1.4(d); see
United States v. Mason, 961 F.2d 1460 (9th Cir. 1992) (district court may base sentencing
upon drug quantity asserted by the presentence report rather than the lesser quantity the
parties had stipulated); United States v. Russell, 913 F.2d 1288, 1293 (8th Cir. 1990), cert.
denied, Moore v. United States, 111 S. Ct. 1687 (1991) (defendant's mistaken belief that
facts contained in the presentence report would mirror those in the stipulation did not
obligate the sentencing court to follow the stipulation). However, the Guidelines mandate
that if the defendant pleaded guilty to one offense but stipulated to a more serious offense
as part of a formal plea agreement, the court must sentence the defendant based on that
more serious offense. U.S.S.G., supra note 10, § 1B1.2(a); see United States v. Gardner, 940
F.2d 587, 590-92 (10th Cir. 1991) (defendant was sentenced for bank robbery, which he
had orally stipulated to at sentencing, rather than the less serious offense of bank larceny
to which he had plead guilty); United States v. Martin, 893 F.2d 73, 74-76 (5th Cir. 1990)
(defendant pleaded guilty to using a communication facility to distribute drugs but stipu-
lated to negotiating for five pounds of methamphetamine; reviewing court found error
because district court failed to sentence for the more serious stipulated offense). See infra
note 179 for an explanation of the effect of policy statements.
161 Courts may consider conduct for which the defendant was acquitted, illegally
seized evidence suppressed at trial, and evidence from the trial of codefendants. See infra
note 251.
162 In a policy statement, the guidelines state that "the court shall resolve disputed
sentencing factors...." U.S.S.G., supra note 10, § 6A1.3(b). A second reason that a court
must resolve disputed factors is that either side may appeal a sentence. 18 U.S.C. § 3742
(1992). If the government did not have the right to appeal, a court might decide in favor
of a defendant to avoid reversal.
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will be adjusted accordingly. The difference in the sentence is dra-
matic. The sentencing range for the distribution of two kilograms of
cocaine is 78 to 97 months; for twenty kilograms it is 151 to 188
months. 163
Once a defendant's offense level is initially calculated, it may be
adjusted either upward or downward depending on additional factors.
Again, consideration of any of these potential adjustments requires
additional factual determinations by the court. Adjustments that may
raise a defendant's offense level include: the status of the victim, 164 a
defendant's aggravating role in an offense, 165 obstructing justice,166
and multiple counts.1 67 Adjustments that may lower a defendant's of-
fense level include: a defendant's mitigating role in an offense' 68 and
acceptance of responsibility.' 69
The second basic determinant, the defendant's criminal history
category, is usually a straightforward determination based on the type
and number of the defendant's prior convictions. 170 However, the
guidelines provide that a court may consider prior adult criminal con-
duct that did not result in a conviction. 171 The criminal history cate-
gory has essentially replaced the traditional assessment at sentencing
of the defendant's character and personal history.172 Policy state-
ments to the guidelines provide that age, education, mental and emo-
tional conditions, physical condition, previous employment, family
ties and responsibilities, and community ties are matters "not ordina-
rily relevant in determining whether a sentence should be outside the
guideline range.' 73
163 U.S.S.G., supra note 10, § 5A.
164 Id. at § 3A1.
165 An upward adjustment for an aggravating role in the offense is limited to four
levels. Id. at § 3B1.1 The downward adjustment for a mitigating role in the offense also is
limited to four levels. Id. at § 3B1.2. In drug cases, where base offense levels are often
high, this limited adjustment seems inadequate to differentiate sentences between key play-
ers and minor figures in distribution networks. Deborah Young, Rethinking the Commission's
Drug Guidelines, 3 FED. SENTENCING REP. 63-66 (1990).
166 U.S.S.G., supra note 10, § 3C1.1.
167 id. at § 3DI.
168 Id. at § 3B1.2.
169 Id. at § 3E1.1. A downward adjustment for acceptance of responsibility has been
described as "a thinly disguised reduction for pleading guilty." United States v. Escobar-
Mejia, 915 F.2d 1152, 1153 (7th Cir. 1990). However, as an application note to this guide-
line makes clear, a defendant's guilty plea does not guarantee such a reduction. U.S.S.G.,
supra note 10, § 3E1.1 (application note 3).
170 U.S.S.G., supra note 10, § 4A1.1.
171 Id. at § 4A1.3.
172 Young, Looking Back to Move Forward, supra note 82, at 147.
173 U.S.S.G., supra note 10, §§ 5H1.1-1.6 (policy statements). Such factors may be rele-
vant in determining where, within a particular sentencing range, the defendant should be
sentenced. In exceptional cases, courts may also consider these factors with departures.
Military, civic, charitable or public service is also designated "not ordinarily relevant."
Id. at § 5H1.11 (policy statement). A defendant's race, sex, national origin, creed, religion,
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Under the guidelines, factual determinations that affect the of-
fense level or the criminal history category influence both the maxi-
mum and minimum penalty that a defendant may receive. Despite
the appellation "guidelines," which suggests a guide that courts are
free to follow or ignore, the guidelines as applied define the appropri-
ate sentence for conduct for which there is a strong presumption. If a
court chooses to sentence outside that prescribed range, the sentence
is deemed a "departure" and the court must give reasons to justify
it.174
A hypothetical example demonstrates the importance of fact-
finding at guidelines sentencing. Assume that, after apprehension, a
drug dealer agrees to provide information about the drug supplier.
The informant tells the government that the supplier has been regu-
larly providing two kilograms of cocaine a month for six months. The
government arranges for an undercover agent to purchase two kilo-
grams of cocaine from the supplier. The undercover agent also nego-
tiates with the supplier to buy ten kilograms of cocaine, but the
supplier is tipped off before that sale occurs.
The supplier is indicted for the two kilogram sale to the under-
cover agent and for conspiracy to sell the ten kilograms that were not
delivered. Because the government wants to use the informant for
future investigations, it does not indict the defendant for the alleged
sale of twelve kilograms to the informant. At trial, the defendant is
convicted of the two kilogram sale to the agent but acquitted of the
conspiracy count. At sentencing an agent tells the court about the
informant's statement that the defendant had sold twelve kilograms of
cocaine to the informant over a six month period. The government
declines to name the informant.'7 5
The judge now must decide whether the government has shown
by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant distributed
the twelve kilograms of cocaine to the informant and whether the de-
fendant conspired to distribute the ten additional kilograms of co-
caine. Thus, the defendant may be sentenced for distributing two
kilograms of cocaine, twelve kilograms of cocaine, fourteen kilograms
and socio-economic status are factors deemed "not relevant" in determining a sentence,
inside or outside the guideline range. Id. at § 5H1.10 (policy statement). Lack of gui-
dance as a youth is "not relevant" for imposing a sentence outside the guideline range. Id.
at § 5H1.12 (policy statement).
See infra note 179 for an explanation of the effect of policy statements.
174 See, e.g., U.S.S.G., supra note 10, § 5KI.I (a).
175 The commentary to section 6A1.3 addresses the general facts set out in this hypo-
thetical. The commentary provides that "[olut-of-court declarations by an unidentified in-
formant may be considered 'where there is good cause for nondisclosure of his identity
and there is sufficient corroboration by other means.'" U.S.S.G., supra note 10, § 6A1.3,
comment., citing United States v. Fatico, 579 F.2d 707, 713 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 444
U.S. 1073 (1980).
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of cocaine, or twenty-four kilograms of cocaine. Assuming all other
sentencing factors are constant, and assuming no criminal history, the
sentence could range from 78 months to 188 months. The court does
not have the discretion to choose between these limits, however. The
court must make factual determinations about whether the defendant
has committed the alleged relevant conduct and sentence
accordingly.
As with any factual determination, accuracy can be regulated in
more than one way. Three parameters generally determine the out-
come of legal fact-finding: the burden of proof, the reliability of the
underlying evidence, and the standards for review of the decision.
Where the chance of an erroneous decision harming an individual is
high, such as conviction of an individual for a crime, a high burden of
proof, a high standard of reliability for the evidence, and a guaran-
teed opportunity for review should be imposed.
As discussed earlier, traditional sentencing imposed none of
these protections. All evidence not demonstrated to be unreliable was
accepted, no formal burden of proof was imposed, and there was vir-
tually no opportunity for review. The Supreme Court held that these
standards met the requirements of the Constitution. 176
With the adoption of the guidelines, Congress changed only the
opportunity for appellate review. Under the guidelines a defendant
may appeal a sentence on the basis that the court improperly applied
the guidelines. 177 Many of these appeals are, essentially, arguments
about the sufficiency of the evidence. Defendants contend that there
was insufficient evidence for the initial offense level determination, an
adjustment, or a departure. 178
The guidelines do suggest 7 9 that the determination of the appro-
priate sentence is to be made by the court after resolving any factual
176 See discussion supra part I.A.
177 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a). The government also has rights to appeal under 18 U.S.C.
§ 3742(b).
178 The statute specifies that a district court's factual findings and its assessments of a
witness' credibility may not be overturned unless the appellate court finds them "clearly
erroneous." 18 U.S.C. § 3742(d).
179 The provisions setting forth sentencing procedures were originally issued as guide-
lines. U.S.S.G., supra note 10, §§ 6Al.1-6A1.3. They were subsequently amended to be
policy statements. Id. Section 6A1.2 was amended to be a policy statement effective June
15, 1988. Id. at App. C., amend, 59. Sections 6A1.1 and 6A1.3 were amended effective
November 1, 1989. Id. at App. C., amends. 293 and 294.
The extent to which policy statements are binding on courts is unclear. Initially, lead-
ing commentators interpreted policy statements to be nonbinding on courts. THOMAS
HUTCHISON & DAVID YELLEN, FEDERAL SENTENCING LAv AND PRACTICE 46 (1989). However,
in Williams v. United States, 112 S. Ct. 1112 (1992), the Supreme Court held that "[w]here
... a policy statement prohibits a district court from taking a specified action, the state-
ment is an authoritative guide to the meaning of the applicable guidelines." Id. at 1119.
The Wifliams holding does not necessarily mean that any policy statement is binding. One
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disputes in a hearing. s0 This limited prescription acknowledges
three aspects of guidelines sentencing: first, the final determination
of the appropriate sentence is to be made by the court; second, the
sentencing determination may only be reached after any disputes over
facts are resolved by the court or determined to be insignificant to the
sentence; and third, disputes over factual issues are to be resolved
publicly.
The first of these, determination of the sentence by the court, is,
in one sense, not a change from pre-guidelines sentencing. Although
the probation officer played an important role in advising the court,
judges have consistently assumed the responsibility for sentencing.
However, in pre-guidelines sentencing, the court essentially estab-
lished the maximum and minimum potential sentence. Subsequent
parole and probation decisions determined the actual time of the sen-
tence.' 81 When Congress established the United States Sentencing
Commission, it phased out parole.' 8 2 Thus, under the guidelines, the
defendant must actually serve the sentence imposed by the trial
court,18 3 unless that court's judgment is reversed by an appellate
court.
commentator has argued that "[wihere the policy statement is not an authoritative guide to
the intended meaning of a particular guideline, the sentencing court should remain free-
consistent with the Williams opinion-to reject the policy statement after giving it due con-
sideration." Ronald F. Wright, The Law of Federal Sentencing in the Supreme Court's 1991-92
Term, 5 FED. SEN'rENcNG REP. 108, 109 (1992). In Stinson v. United States, 113 S. Ct. 1913
(1993), the Supreme Court in dicta suggested that policy statements generally are binding
on federal courts. Id. at 1917. Professor Wright described this dicta as "seriously over-
stat[ing] the authority of policy statements." Ronald F. Wright, Federal Sentencing Law in the
Supreme Courts 1992-93 Term, 6 FED. SENTENCING REP. 39, 41 n.8 (1993).
180 The guidelines do not explicitly state that a court must hold a sentencing hearing
or describe what such a hearing should entail. The first reference to a hearing appears in a
policy statement:
Courts should adopt procedures to provide for the timely disclosure of the
presentence report; the narrowing and resolution, where feasible, of issues
in dispute in advance of the sentencing hearing; and the identification for
the court of issues remaining in dispute.
U.S.S.G., supra note 10, § 6A1.2 (policy statement). The following policy statement refers
to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 32(a) (1), which provides that there should be a
sentencing hearing at which attorneys for the defendant and for the government should
have an opportunity to comment on the presentence report and other matters relating to
the sentence. The commentary to policy statement 6A1.3 suggests that although factors at
pre-guidelines sentencing were determined in an informal fashion, " [m] ore formality is...
unavoidable if the sentencing process is to be accurate and fair" under guidelines sentenc-
ing. Id. at § 6A1.3 (commentary).
181 The theory of parole was that parole officials would determine when a prisoner was
rehabilitated and ready to rejoin society. Freed, supra note 16, at 1689 n.34.
182 Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1987 (1984) (codified
and amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 3551-3742 (1988); 28 U.S.C. §§ 991-98 (1988).
183 However, as with pre-guidelines sentencing, federal statutes provide that a defen-
dant's sentence may be administratively reduced by a statutorily specified amount of time
for good behavior in prison. 18 U.S.C. § 3624 (1988). Currently, a prisoner may receive
up to fifty-four days per year in good time credit. Id.
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The second factor, the requirement of resolution of disputed
facts, is a more significant change. Although the Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure previously required a sentencing hearing, that
hearing merely required that the defendant, the defendant's counsel,
and the attorney for the government each be given an opportunity to
speak. 184 The rules did not require resolution of disputed factual is-
sues. Judge Eisele has written that under discretionary sentencing
judges would usually omit from consideration facts in the presentence
report that the defendant denied.18 5 This clearly was not required,
however, by statute or case law. At a minimum, under discretionary
sentencing a judge could give evidence less weight if it seemed less
reliable. Chapter Six of the guidelines, governing sentencing proce-
dures, provides little guidance for how fact-finding should be accom-
plished.18 6 Consequently, the standards for fact-finding at guidelines
sentencing have evolved in the courts.
The requirement that factual disputes be resolved publicly high-
lights the importance of each factor in sentencing. Moreover, the cre-
ation of a record provides both a basis for appellate review of an
individual case and for evaluation of the sentencing process. Despite
the public record and the specifically delineated right to appeal, ap-
peals based on evidence issues do little to raise evidentiary standards.
As with review of alleged evidentiary errors from trial, appellate courts
give the trial court great deference, applying a clearly erroneous stan-
dard of review.'8 7
In practice, specific facts used in sentencing may be determined
at various stages of the process. The facts of the case may be first
outlined in an arrest warrant, 88 an indictment, or an information.1 9
For a mandatory minimum narcotics offense, the quantity of narcotics
will be alleged in the indictment. For other offenses, the indictment
may be more general. For example, a fraud indictment may or may
not allege a specific quantity of money was fraudulently obtained.
Once a trial court admits evidence about the details of an offense,
which it then relies on in determining the appropriate sentence, a
defendant has little hope for subsequently challenging the use of such
184 FED. R CuM. P. 32(a)(1).
185 United States v. Clark, 792 F. Supp. 637, 649-50 (E.D. Ark. 1992).
186 Policy statement § 6A1.3 merely provides that "[i ] n resolving any reasonable dispute
concerning a factor important to the sentencing determination, the court may consider
relevant information without regard to its admissibility under the rules of evidence applica-
ble at trial, provided that the information has sufficient indicia of reliability to support its
probable accuracy." U.S.S.G., supra note 10, § 6A1.3 (policy statement).
187 18 U.S.C. § 3742 (a).
188 The contents of an arrest warrant are governed by Federal Rule of Criminal Proce-
dure 4(c)(1). FED. R. CriM. P. 4(c)(1).
189 The contents of an information or indictment are governed by Federal Rule of
Criminal Procedure 7(c)(1). FED. R. CriM. P. 7(c)(1).
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evidence. The district court's factual findings are protected by the
clearly erroneous rule, 190 even when the court relied on uncorrobo-
rated hearsay statements of an unidentified declarant. 191
The Sentencing Reform Act does not specify the burden of proof
that should be imposed at sentencing or establish new evidentiary
standards for sentencing under the guidelines. 192 Congress left these
matters for the Sentencing Commission or the courts to resolve.
The Sentencing Commission acknowledged the need for higher
evidentiary standards under the guidelines, but simply adopted the
pre-guidelines standard. Policy statement 6A1.3193 states that at sen-
tencing a court may "consider relevant information without regard to
its admissibility under the rules of evidence applicable at trial, pro-
vided that the information has sufficient indicia of reliability to sup-
port its probable accuracy." 194 Circuit courts developed the "sufficient
indicia" standard as a minimal limitation on the expansive informa-
tion that could be considered by courts at pre-guidelines sentenc-
ing.195 The Commission left to the courts the responsibility to
"determine the appropriate procedure" for resolving factual dis-
putes.196 However, the Commission did state in commentary that "the
use of a preponderance of the evidence standard is appropriate to
meet due process requirements and policy concerns in resolving dis-
putes regarding application of the guidelines to the facts of a case."' 9 7
190 18 U.S.C. § 3742(e); see United States v. Cetina-Comez, 951 F.2d 432, 434 (1st Cir.
1991); United States v. Poole, 929 F.2d 1476, 1483 (10th Cir. 1991); United States v. Alfaro,
919 F.2d 962, 966-68 (5th Cir. 1990); United States v. Thomas, 870 F.2d 174, 176 (5th Cir.
1989).
191 United States v. Manthei, 913 F.2d 1130, 1138 (5th Cir. 1990).
192 The Act alludes to evidentiary standards only where it recodifies 18 U.S.C. § 3577
into 18 U.S.C. § 3661. This section provides that "[n]o limitation shall be placed on the
information concerning the background, character, and conduct of a person" who is being
sentenced. 18 U.S.C. § 3661 (1987). The Supreme Court established this standard in Wil-
liams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241 (1949). See supra part I.A-2.
193 The Commission originally issued § 6A1.3 as a guideline. It was amended, to con-
vert it to a policy statement, effective November 1, 1989. U.S.S.G., supra note 10, App. C,
amend. 294. The Commission stated, without further explanation, that "[d]esignation of
this section as a policy statement is more consistent with the nature of the subject matter."
Id. For an explanation of the impact of policy statements, see discussion supra note 179.
194 U.S.S.G., supra note 10, § 6A1.3.
195 The actual standard developed by the circuit courts was one requiring "minimal
indicia" of reliability. E.g., United States v. Baylin, 696 F.2d 1030, 1039-40 (3d Cir. 1982).
Because the minimal indicia standard and the sufficient indicia standard have been inter-
preted as imposing approximately the same reliability constraints on courts, this article
uses the terms interchangeably. For an example of a case that also uses these terms inter-
changeably, see United States v. Silverman, 976 F.2d 1502, 1504 (6th Cir. 1992), cert. denied,
113 S. Ct. 1595 (1993). At least one court has stated that the sufficient indicia standard is
the more stringent standard. See United States v. Paulino, 996 F.2d 1541 (3d Cir. 1993),
cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 449 (1993).
196 U.S.S.G., supra note 10, § 6A1.3 commentary.
197 Id. at § 6A1.3 commentary.
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II
WRESTLING WITH THE GUIDELINES: JUDICIAL APPROACHES
TO THE LACK OF EVIDENTIARY STANDARDS
Once the guidelines were enacted, defendants soon began chal-
lenging the low standards for fact-finding at sentencing.198 The focal
points of guidelines sentencing are the offense level and the defen-
dant's criminal history, which the government need establish only by
the low evidentiary standards. In contrast, evidence that defendants
introduced at discretionary sentencing now has minimal impact on
sentencing decisions because, in most instances, the guidelines limit
consideration of the defendant's age, education, mental and emo-
tional condition, physical condition, previous employment, family ties
and responsibilities and community ties. 199 Thus, the prosecution pri-
marily benefits from loose evidentiary standards. Also, unlike with dis-
cretionary sentencing, guidelines sentencing enables a defendant to
directly trace the length of the sentence imposed to specific evidence.
These factors have created among defendants a constituency for
changing evidentiary standards at sentencing.200
Defendants' challenges to the lack of procedural protections for
fact-finding under the guidelines have often involved sentences based
on information in the form of hearsay.201 The hearsay may appear
in the presentence report 20 2 or in testimony by a government
198 See, e.g., United States v. Sciarrino, 884 F.2d 95, 96-97 (3d Cir. 1989), cert. denied,
493 U.S. 997 (1989) (defendant's assertion that sentencing guidelines precluded use of
hearsay rejected by reviewing court which reasoned that because hearsay was permitted
before the guidelines, it should therefore be allowed under the guidelines). Defendants
have continued to challenge the low fact-finding standard at sentencing. See, e.g., United
States v. Mergerson, 995 F.2d 1285, 1291-93 (5th Cir. 1993) (appellate court rejected de-
fendant's assertion that the district court should have applied a beyond the reasonable
doubt standard at sentencing; reviewing court confirmed that the preponderance standard
was proper).
199 Policy statements to the guidelines provide that age, education, mental and emo-
tional conditions, physical condition, previous employment, family ties and responsibilities,
and community ties are "not ordinarily relevant in determining whether a sentence should
be outside the guidelines." U.S.S.G., supra note 10, §§ 5H1.1-5H1.6. For an explanation of
the impact of policy statements, see supra note 179. Professor Marc Miller has argued that
Congress' purposes for sentencing require an assessment of a defendant's history and char-
acteristics. Miller, supra note 3, at 464.
200 The constituency for changing the evidentiary standards for guidelines sentencing
in the courts is defendants and their counsel. Many scholars and judges have joined in this
constituency.
201 See, e.g., United States v. Miele, 989 F.2d 659, 664 (3d Cir. 1993); United States v.
Silverman, 976 F.2d 1502 (6th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1595 (1993).
202 The presentence report includes information about the history and characteristics
of the defendant (including financial status and criminal record); classification of the of-
fense and of the defendant; the kinds of sentence and sentence ranges; explanation of
factors that may indicate a departure from the guidelines may be warranted; information
regarding impact (e.g., financial, social, medical) upon victim(s); and information con-
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agent.20 3 This use of hearsay may occur with any fact that must be
determined at sentencing, but has proved particularly troubling when
the defendant is being sentenced for relevant conduct after convic-
tion for a "base offense." 20 4
In addressing these problems, courts have considered three ave-
nues for raising the standards at sentencing: first, a due process re-
quirement that the burden of proof be higher than a preponderance
of the evidence, particularly with respect to sentencing for relevant
conduct that could have been the basis of separate charges; 205 second,
a limit on hearsay evidence required by the Confrontation Clause or
Due Process Clause;20 and third, specialized, judicially created rules
to regulate fact-finding procedures at sentencing.20 7
Analysis of these avenues is complicated because judges who ap-
pear to share the same basic concern about the lack of procedural
protections may propose different solutions predicated on different
rationales. One judge may propose a different burden of proof while
another proposes not relying on hearsay. The first judge may argue
the Due Process Clause requires the higher burden; the second judge
may make the same claim or rely on the confrontation clause. Also,
relying on pre-guidelines case law necessarily involves applying old
rules and analyses to a fundamentally different sentencing system.208
A review of post-guidelines case law indicates that the degree of
thought courts have given to applying old rules to new sentencing var-
ies dramatically.20 9
cerning nature and extent of non-prison programs and resources available to the defen-
dant. Fm. R. CRam. P. 32(c) (2).
203 See, e.g., United States v. Sherbak, 950 F.2d 1095, 1100-01 (5th Cir. 1992) (district
court credited Drug Enforcement Agency officer's unsworn statements over the defen-
dant's counter-assertions).
204 See discussion supra note 159.
205 See discussion infra part IIA
206 U.S. CoNsr. amends V & VI. See discussion infra part II.B.
207 See discussion infra part II.C.
208 Judge Heaney of the Eighth Circuit makes this point. See Heaney, supra note 16, at
166.
209 Compare United States v. Concepcion, 983 F.2d 369, 393 (2d Cir. 1992), cert. denied,
114 S. Ct. 163 (1993) (Newman, J., concurring) (noting the "bizarre results" that can be
created by applying pre-guidelines case law to guidelines sentencing); United States v.
Mobley, 956 F.2d 450, 465-66 (3d Cir. 1992) (Mansmanu,J., dissenting) (describing differ-
ences between pre-guidelines and guidelines sentencing schemes and why those differ-
ences matter) with United States v. Sciarrino, 884 F.2d 95, 96-97 (3d Cir. 1989), cert. denied,
493 U.S. 997 (1989) (stating without explanation that because hearsay statements were
admissible under pre-guidelines sentencing, they should continue to be admissible under
guidelines sentencing).
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A. The Burden of Proof
Burdens of proof21 ° establish the standard of proof and allocate
which party bears the responsibility for providing the proof on a par-
ticular issue. The burden of proof theoretically determines outcomes
in cases depending on who has the burden of proof and what level of
proof is required. In addition to allocating the risk of error, the bur-
den of proof instructs the fact-finder about the degree of confidence
society deems appropriate for a particular decision.21' Absent a stat-
ute specifying the burden of proof, defendants have looked to the
Due Process Clause as the foundation for that right.
The Supreme Court never ruled that due process required a par-
ticular burden of proof under general pre-guidelines discretionary
sentencing.21 2 Under that sentencing scheme, courts were not re-
quired to make any factual findings before imposing a sentence, so
there was no clear need for standards establishing facts or direct con-
sequences for failing to do so. In McMillan, the Court explicitly did
find a preponderance of the evidence standard adequate for
mandatory minimum sentencing.213
Cases questioning the standard of proof for guidelines sentenc-
ing first reached the federal courts of appeal three years after McMil-
lan. In United States v. Wright,214 the defendant argued that the
preponderance of the evidence standard was inadequate for evaluat-
ing evidence of relevant conduct at sentencing.21 5 Writing for a First
Circuit panel, Judge Breyer, a member of the United States Sentenc-
ing Commission, dismissed this challenge with the conclusion from
McMillan that, "[t]he Supreme Court has held that the 'preponder-
ance standard satisfies due process.' "216 Judge Breyer's opinion did
210 "Burden of proof" is a term used to refer to either the "burden of persuasion" or
the "burden of production." LiuLY, supra note 70, at 41 n.2. In the context of evaluating
standards for fact-finding at guidelines sentencing, courts have fairly consistently used
"burden of proof" to mean "burden of persuasion." To avoid confusion, this article fol-
lows the courts' convention. The burden of persuasion regulates the decision of close
cases by the fact-finder and the burden of production specifies the result when evidence on
an issue is inadequate to satisfy the threshold requirement. Barbara D. Underwood, The
Thumb on the Scales ofJustice: Burdens of Persuasion in Criminal Cases, 86 YALE LJ. 1299, 1300
(1977).
211 Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 423 (1978) (citing In reWinship, 397 U.S. 358,
370 (1970)) (Harlan, J., concurring).
212 In Williams v. New York, the Court concluded that the "due process clause should
not be treated as a device for freezing the evidential procedure of sentencing in the mold
of trial procedure," but did not explicitly discuss the burden of proof. 337 U.S. 241, 251
(1949).
213 See discussion supra part I.A.3.
214 873 F.2d 437 (1st Cir. 1989).
215 Id. at 441.
216 Id. (citing McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 79, 91 (1986)).
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not discuss whether guidelines sentencing warranted reconsideration
of the standards used for discretionary sentencing.
Although the Supreme Court has not addressed the issue,217 each
of the federal courts of appeals has concluded that, in most instances,
the appropriate standard of proof for resolving factual disputes at
guidelines sentencing is a preponderance of the evidence.21 8 Some
courts have followed the lead of Wright and reached this conclusion
with little analysis.219 Other courts have looked beyond McMillan and
pointed to the Sentencing Commission's declination to adopt any
standard of proof,220 to the fact that the defendant was already de-
prived of the right to liberty at the point of conviction so that the
217 The Supreme Court recently denied certiorari on the issue of burden of proof at
sentencing in Kinder v. United States, 112 S. Ct. 2290 (1992). Justice White dissented,
noting that, "[t]he Sentencing Guidelines do not explicitly adopt a standard of proof re-
quired for relevant conduct, and we have not visited this issue since its new procedures
took effect in November 1987." Id. at 2292. Justice White observed that, "[t] he burden of
proof at sentencing proceedings is an issue of daily importance to the district courts, with
implications for all sentencing findings." Id. The justice recognized that the importance
of this issue rests on the fact that, "[t]he resolution of disputed matters at sentencing...
controls the length of the sentence actually to be imposed." Id.
218 United States v. Wilson, 900 F.2d 1350, 1353-54 (9th Cir. 1990); United States v.
Frederick, 897 F.2d 490, 492-93 (10th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 863 (1990); United
States v. Alston, 895 F.2d 1362, 1372-73 (1lth Cir. 1990); United States v. Gooden, 892 F.2d
725, 727-28 (8th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 496 U.S. 908 (1990); United States v. Casto, 889
F.2d 567, 570 (5th Cir. 1989); United States v. Silverman, 889 F.2d 1531, 1535 (6th Cir.
1989), cert. deniAe, 113 S. Ct. 1595 (1993); United States v. Guerra, 888 F.2d 247, 249-51 (2d
Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1090 (1990); United States v. Burke, 888 F.2d 862, 869
(D.C. Cir. 1989); United States v. McDowell, 888 F.2d 285, 290-91 (3d Cir. 1989); United
States v. Urrego-Linares, 879 F.2d 1234, 1237-38 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 943 (1989);
United States v. Wright, 873 F.2d 437, 441-42 (1st Cir. 1989); United States v. White, 888
F.2d 490, 499 (7th Cir. 1989).
219 See, e.g., United States v. Urrego-Linares, 879 F.2d 1234, 1237-38 (4th Cir.), cert.
denied, 493 U.S. 943 (1989). The court's opinion, which was written by Judge Wilkins (who
served as a member of the Federal Sentencing Commission) relied on McMillan, stating
that it saw no reason to apply a higher standard. Id. at 1238. The court added that:
Fairness to a defendant is substantially increased under guideline sentenc-
ing with application of a preponderance of the evidence standard, for if a
court is considering applying an aggravating factor which will have the ef-
fect of increasing the sentence, the court must afford a defendant the op-
portunity to oppose and specifically address its application.
Id. See also United States v. White, 888 F.2d 490, 499 (7th Cir. 1989), in which the court
noted the potential conflict between respecting ajury's verdict and sentencing for all rele-
vant conduct if a defendant was acquitted of a charge but found the evidence persuasive by
a preponderance of the evidence. The court concluded that the issue was not ripe for
decision. Id. For another case in which the court arrived at this conclusion, see United
States v. Alston, 895 F.2d 1362, 1372-73 (lth Cir. 1990).
220 United States v. Gooden 892 F.2d 725, 727-28 (8th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 496 U.S.
908 (1990); United States v. Guerra, 888 F.2d 247, 250-51 (2d Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 494
U.S. 1090 (1990).
A preliminary draft of the guidelines required that judges apply a preponderance of
the evidence standard. Harvey M. Silets & Susan W. Brenner, Commentary on the Preliminary
Draft of the Sentencing Guidelines Issued by the United States Sentencing Commission in September,
1986, 77J. Cam. L. & CRIMINoLoGY 1069, 1079 (1986). Ironically, this requirement was
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sentencing proceeding was not as critical as the finding of guilt,221 or
to the courts' concern with judicial economy.222 These are essentially
the same justifications that were offered for not providing procedural
protections at pre-guidelines discretionary sentencing.223
The Tenth Circuit explicitly considered the appropriateness of
continuing the pre-guidelines standards in United States v. Frederick224
In addition to relying on McMillan, the court found support in the
Sentencing Reform Act's continuation of the Williams standard that
no limits should be placed on the information a court could consider
at sentencing.225 The Tenth Circuit reasoned that because Congress
did not modify this rule, the pre-guidelines sentencing procedures
were presumptively correct.226
In upholding the preponderance standard, some courts also
pointed to the appellate courts' previous refusal to raise the standard
of proof at sentencings where an increased penalty resulted from a
finding that the defendant was a dangerous special offender.227
Although primarily relying on McMillan to find that the government
did not have to prove sentencing factors beyond a reasonable doubt,
the Ninth Circuit considered the impact of requiring only a prepon-
derance of the evidence. In United States v. Wilson,228 the court recog-
nized that the standard was simply "that the relevant fact is deemed
more likely true than not on the basis of the available information-
no matter how limited or unreliable."229
In discussing their concern with the low burden of proof, judges
and scholars have often focused on the Supreme Court's analysis in
McMillan that a sentencing factor may be determined by a lower bur-
den of proof when that factor is one traditionally associated with sen-
not enacted because of the realization that the pre-guidelines system differed too greatly to
provide an effective model for the new sentencing scheme. Id.
221 United States v. McDowell, 888 F.2d 285 (3d Cir. 1989). The McDowell court ob-
served that "[o]nce criminal proceedings reach the sentencing stage, the decision has al-
ready been made that the defendant can be deprived of his liberty." Id. at 290.
222 Id. "The long history of judicial sentencing and strong policy reasons, including
judicial economy, persuade us .. .that a defendant's rights in sentencing are met by a
preponderance of evidence standard." Id. at 291. The McDowel court limited its holding
to cases involving simple enhancement. Id. at 290-91. The court did not consider cases
where the adjustment was "a new and separate offense." Id. at 291.
223 See discussion supra Part I.
224 897 F.2d 490 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 863 (1990).
225 Id. at 492.
226 Id.
227 United States v. Silverman, 889 F.2d 1531, 1535 (6th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 113 S.
Ct. 1595 (1993) (citing United States v. Davis, 710 F.2d 104 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S.
1001 (1983)).
228 900 F.2d 1350 (9th Cir. 1990).
229 Id. at 1354 (citing United States v. Davis, 715 F. Supp. 1473, 1481 (C.D. Cal. 1989),
cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 210 (1992).
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tencing, rather than traditionally deemed to be a separate crime.2 30
Accordingly, some judges concluded that the sentencing factor in-
volved in calculating the relevant conduct of a drug offense which in-
cluded separate drug sales went beyond the McMillan principle and
warranted a higher burden of proof.2 31
In United States v. Restrepo,2 32 the Ninth Circuit, sitting en banc,
reconsidered the question of standard of proof in the context of a
significant increase in sentence based on relevant conduct. The
Restrepo court found the preponderance of the evidence standard ade-
quate but defined it to require that a court be convinced "by a pre-
ponderance of the evidence that the fact in question exists." 233 This
definition contrasts with the literal interpretation that courts need
only weigh the evidence and find that the evidence tipped the
scales.234
Despite the uniformity in outcome among the circuits in uphold-
ing the preponderance of the evidence standard, there was great dis-
sension among the Ninth Circuit judges in Restrepo.235 The dissenters
distinguished between the guidelines sentencing for relevant conduct
and the McMillan finding of a sentencing factor.2 36 Because separate
sales of illegal substances can be charged as separate crimes, some
dissenters found that relevant conduct sentencing under the guide-
lines crossed the constitutional line, drawn in McMillan, between ele-
ments of a crime and traditional sentencing factors.2 37
Judges opposed to continuing the preponderance of the evi-
dence standard have condoned low evidentiary standards at pre-guide-
lines sentencing but have argued that prior case law, such as Williams,
230 Generally, judges cite McMillan for the proposition that guidelines sentencing may
employ the preponderance of the evidence standard without provoking any due process
concerns. See, e.g., United States v. Galloway, 976 F.2d 414, 422-26 (8th Cir.) cert. denied,
113 S. Ct. 1420 (1992); United States v. Mobley, 956 F.2d 450, 454-459 (3d Cir. 1992);
United States v. Richards, 936 F.2d 575 (7th Cir. 1991). In relying upon McMillan, courts
seek to allay any worry about the overlapping of current guidelines practice onto pre-
guidelines case law by explaining that "[t]he Sentencing Guidelines do not differ from the
Pennsylvania statute [at issue in McMillan] in any manner material to a constitutional in-
quiry." Galloway, 976 F.2d at 423 (citing United States v. Restrepo, 946 F.2d 654, 657 (9th
Cir. 1991) (en banc) cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1564 (1992)).
231 See infra note 243 and accompanying text.
232 946 F.2d 654 (9th Cir. 1991) (en banc), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1564 (1992).
233 Id. at 661 (citing United States v. Streeter, 907 F.2d 781, 792 (8th Cir. 1990), over-
ruled on other grounds, by United States v. Wise, 976 F.2d 393 (8th Cir. 1992)).
234 United States v. Restrepo, 903 F.2d 648, 654 (9th Cir. 1990) (panel opinion), modi-
fied, United States v. Restrepo, 946 F.2d 654 (9th Cir. 1991) (en banc), cert. deniAe, 112 S.
Ct. 1564 (1992).
235 United States v. Restrepo, 946 F.2d at 663-78.
236 Id. at 665 (Norris, J., dissenting).
237 Id. at 664-65 (Norris, J., dissenting).
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has little relevance in evaluating the guidelines' constitutionality.238
Some have also contended that sentencing under the guidelines is
analogous to the sentencing scheme discussed in Specht v. Patterson23 9
because the maximum penalty available to the court is raised by a
finding of relevant conduct.240 The Court in McMillan distinguished
Specht because McMillan did not raise the maximum potential
sentence.241
Five courts of appeals have suggested that an increase in penalty
due to information presented at the sentencing phase might be so
great in relation to the sentence for the original crime of conviction
that the standard of proof should be higher than a preponderance of
the evidence. 242 In United States v. Kikumura,243 the Third Circuit con-
cluded that due process required fact-finding by clear and convincing
evidence when the consequence was an increase in sentence from
thirty months to thirty years. The court observed that this was a case
of "a tail which wags the dog of the substantive offense."244 Kikumura
presented an easier case than usual because the district court had
noted that although a preponderance was sufficient, its findings were
supported by clear and convincing evidence. 245 Accordingly, reversal
was not required.
The problem with Kikumura was subsequently illustrated in United
States v. Townley, 246 in which the Eighth Circuit acknowledged that at
some point the disparity might be so great as to require a higher level
238 United States v. Galloway, 976 F.2d 414, 436 (8th Cir.) (Bright,J. dissenting), cert.
denied, 113 S. Ct. 1420 (1992). Commentators also have recognized that Williams and its
progeny simply are inapposite in achieving the guidelines' objectives. Meeting these objec-
tives "requires ... a complete restructuring of the policies and practices of the federal
sentencing system, since that system is and always has been predicated upon the concept of
judicial discretion." Silets & Brenner, supra note 220, at 1079.
239 386 U.S. 605 (1967).
240 Galloway, 976 F.2d at 441 (Bright, J., dissenting).
241 McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 79, 88-89 (1986).
242 United States v. Billingsley, 978 F.2d 861, 866 (5th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct.
1661 (1993); United States v. Galloway, 976 F.2d 414, 417 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct.
1420 (1992); United States v. Lam Kwong-Wah, 966 F.2d 682, 688 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied,
113 S. Ct. 287 (1992); United States v. Restrepo, 946 F.2d 654, 659 (9th Cir. 1991) (en
banc), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1564 (1992); United States v. St.Julian, 922 F.2d 563, 569 n.1
(10th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 348 (1992).
The Seventh Circuit has sent contradictory messages regarding the proper burden of
proof when fact-finding at sentencing greatly increases the length of the sentence. Compare
United States v. Masters, 978 F.2d 281, 286-87 (7th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 2333
(1993) (Constitution does not require.higher burden of proof) with United States v. Tru-
jillo, 959 F.2d 1377, 1381-82 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 277 (1992) (agreeing with
Kikumura holding that in some situations a higher burden of proof at sentencing is re-
quired) and United States v. Schuster, 948 F.2d 313, 315 (7th Cir. 1992) (same).
243 918 F.2d 1084 (3d Cir. 1990).
244 Id. at 1100-01 (citing McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 79, 88 (1986)).
245 Id. at 1102-04.
246 929 F.2d 365 (8th Cir. 1991).
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of proof, although the increase in Townley did not reach that point.2 4 7
The "standard" with which the courts are left is that they should know
that level of disparity when they see it.248 This vague standard re-
quires a two-level determination that is unnecessary and difficult.
First, a court must identify whether the disparity is "a tail which wags
the dog," that is, whether the additional penalty is so great as to raise
due process concerns. Second, the court must impose the corre-
sponding standard of proof2 49 Notably, Kikumura and related cases
fail to identify a logical basis for creating a dual standard. Whether
the defendant's sentence is increased by two months or twenty years,
the defendant should have the same right to a valid decision based on
reliable evidence.
This type of individual case analysis fails to recognize the impor-
tance of a systemwide change in the sentencing process. Under the
guidelines, courts consider not just one factor, as in McMillan, but
many factors. Some of these factors were traditionally considered at
sentencing, but many could have been charged as separate crimes. At
the same time the guidelines impose specific consequences for each
of these factors. Consequently, the guidelines make it possible for the
government to avoid the traditional, difficult choice of whether to
charge an offense and attempt to prove it beyond a reasonable doubt
or to forego seeking punishment because there is insufficient proof of
247 Id. at 370.
248 As in Towney, other courts confronted with increases in the length of a sentence
have concluded without elaboration that the clear and convincing standard had not been
triggered by the increase in defendant's sentence. See United States v. Galloway, 976 F.2d
414, 425-27 (8th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1420 (1993) (three-fold increase in de-
fendant's sentence did not violate defendant's due process rights); United States v. Lam
Kwong-Wah, 966 F.2d 682, 688 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 287 (1992) (six level
increase not significant enough to require dear and convincing standard); United States v.
Trujillo, 959 F.2d 1377, 1382 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 277 (1992) (sentence in-
crease of 4.5 years did not merit higher level of due process).
249 District courts anticipating the possibility of this two level standard may attempt to
forestall the problem by acknowledging it. A number of appellate court decisions observe
that district courts are specifying that their resolution of disputed sentencing facts satisfies
both the preponderance of the evidence and the clear and convincing standards. See, e.g.,
United States v. Mergerson, 995 F.2d 1285, 1291 (5th Cir. 1993); United States v. Corbin,
998 F.2d 1377, 1387-88 (7th Cir. 1993); United States v. Concepcion, 983 F.2d 369, 390 (2d
Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 163 (1993); United States v. Billingsley, 978 F.2d 861, 866
(5th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1661 (1993). Use of both the preponderance and
clear and convincing standards may indicate district courts' uncertainty and discomfort
with the current vague standard.
Appellate courts routinely dismiss defendants' arguments that the beyond a reason-
able doubt standard should be applied. See, e.g., Mergerson, 995 F.2d at 1291; Corbin, 998
F.2d at 1388. At least one district court, however, has applied the reasonable doubt stan-
dard. SeeUnited States v. Trujillo, 959 F.2d 1377, 1382 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 277
(1992).
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the conduct.2 50 The judge has no basis under the guidelines for find-
ing the low burden of proof was met but concluding that such a sen-
tence would be excessive. The guidelines thus enable the government
to obtain a much higher sentence for a much lower level of proof and
expenditure of resources. Moreover, at sentencing a court may ig-
nore ajury's verdict of not guilty on a particular count, even in a case
of jury nullification.25' The judge, if following current law, may not
ameliorate the sentence. The traditional checks and balances of jury
250 An ongoing criticism of the guidelines has been that they transfer to the prosecu-
tion the discretion that historically was accorded to the judge. See, e.g., United States v.
Harrington, 947 F.2d 956, 963-70 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (Edwards, J., concurring); United States
v. Stanley, 928 F.2d 575, 582-83 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 141 (1991); United States v.
Boshell, 728 F. Supp. 632, 637-38 (E.D. Wash. 1990); Alschuler, supra note 16, at 926; Koh,
supra note 16.
251 Eleven circuits have ruled that conduct underlying charges of which the defendant
was acquitted may be considered at sentencing. See United States v. Paulino, 996 F.2d
1541, 1546-49 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 449 (1993) (while jury determined that
approximately 390 grams of cocaine were involved in defendant's drug conspiracy, district
court calculated defendant's sentence based on its finding that between 127 to 140 kilo-
grams of cocaine were involved); United States v. Wright, 996 F.2d 312 (10th Cir. 1993)
(sentencing court may sentence defendant for conspiracy although jury acquitted defen-
dant of that charge), United States v. Lynch, 934 F.2d 1226, 1234-37 (l1th Cir. 1991), cert.
denied, 112 S. Ct. 885 (1992) (sentencing court took into account defendant's possession of
a firearm although the jury had acquitted defendant of this possession); see also United
States v. Boney, 977 F.2d 624, 635 (D.C. Cir. 1992); United States v. Galloway, 976 F. 2d
414, 422-25 (8th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1420 (1992); United States v. Former, 920
F.2d 1330, 1332-33 (7th Cir. 1990); United States v. Duncan, 918 F.2d 647, 652 (6th Cir.
1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 2055 (1991); United States v. Rodriguez-Gonzalez, 899 F.2d
177, 180-81 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 844 (1990); United States v. Mocciola, 891 F.2d
13, 16-17 (1st Cir. 1989); United States v. Isom, 886 F.2d 736, 738-39 (4th Cir. 1989);
United States v. Juarez-Ortega, 866 F.2d 747, 74849 (5th Cir. 1989).
The Ninth Circuit is alone in concluding that a district court may not consider acquit-
ted conduct at sentencing. United States v. Brady, 928 F.2d 844 (9th Cir. 1991). The Brady
court reasoned that while a sentencing court may consider evidence of factors not part of
the offense of conviction, "it does not follow that the Guidelines permit a court to recon-
sider facts during sentencing that have been rejected by a jury's not guilty verdict." Id. at
851.
Judge Newman of the Second Circuit has urged that the role acquitted conduct plays
at sentencing "must be modified [because a] just system of criminal sentencing cannot fail
to distinguish between an allegation of conduct resulting in a conviction and an allegation
of conduct resulting in an acquittal." United States v. Concepcion, 983 F.2d 369, 396 (2d
Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 163 (Newman, J., dissenting).
An amendment proposed to the guidelines in 1993 by the Practitioners' Advisory
Group would have precluded the sentencing court from considering conduct of which the
jury had acquitted the defendant. Proposed Amendments to the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines, 52 CRxM. L. REP'. (BNA) 2194 (Feb. 3, 1993). An alternative proposal put forth
by the same group would have required the prosecution to prove acquitted conduct by a
clear and convincing standard. Id. While twenty-two proposals were accepted by the Com-
mission for amendment, neither of these proposals were among those accepted. 58 Fed.
Reg. 27,148, 27,148-60 (1993).
Additionally, a court may consider illegally seized evidence which was suppressed at
trial. United States v. McCrory, 930 F.2d 63, 69 (D.C. Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 885
(1992); United States v. Torres, 926 F.2d 321, 322-25 (3d Cir. 1991). A court may also
consider evidence from the trial of co-defendants, so long as that evidence does not come
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determination of the facts and judge determination of the sentence
are eliminated.
Ironically, one court has stated that fairness to a defendant has
substantially increased under the guidelines, even with the low stan-
dard of proof.252 A comprehensive look at the procedural protections
of the guidelines suggests otherwise. There is no requirement that
the government present proof that would be admissible under the
Federal Rules of Evidence. There is a presumption that the informa-
tion in the presentence report is correct. 253 These procedural rules
do not protect the defendant.2 54
as an unfair surprise to defendant. United States v. Morales, 994 F.2d 386, 389-90 (7th Cir.
1993).
252 United States v. Arrego-Linares, 879 F.2d 1234, 1238 (4th Cir.), cert. denid 493 U.S.
943 (1989).
253 See United States v. Smiley, 997 F.2d 475, 483 (8th Cir. 1993) (BrightJ., dissenting)
(noting that probation officer's sentencing recommendations in the presentence report
are "often summarily approve [d]" by the court); United States v. Bartsh, 985 F.2d 930, 932
(8th Cir. 1993) (district court properly accepted presentence report's calculation of
amount that defendant embezzled because defendant failed to object to this calculation);
United States v. Harrington, 947 F.2d 956, 966 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (EdwardsJ, concurring)
(observing that "many trial judges appear to accept the Report as written"); United States
v. Mir, 919 F.2d 940, 942-43 (5th Cir. 1990) (defendant's failure to present rebuttal evi-
dence to presentence report's finding that he was a leader in a narcotics conspiracy and
that he possessed a greater amount of drugs than he admitted to meant that district court
could consider the report's findings when calculating defendant's sentence); see also FED.
R. Evm. 1101(d) (3), Advisory Committee Notes (in sentencing, "great reliance is placed on
the presentence investigation and report"); Heaney, supra note 16, at 169 n.22 and accom-
panying text.
Some appellate courts have reversed trial courts which relied on the presumption that
the presentence report is correct without considering the quality of the underlying infor-
mation. See, e.g., United States v. Watkins, 994 F.2d 1192, 1195-96 (6th Cir. 1993) (in calcu-
lating the total amount of intended loss caused by defendant's check kiting scheme,
sentencing court relied solely on the presentence report because the government did not
present any evidence regarding this issue; reviewing court vacated the sentence and re-
manded for resentencing because the report was inadequate); United States v. Gilliam, 987
F.2d 1009, 1014 (4th Cir. 1993) (presentence report based quantity of drugs that defen-
dant possessed on amount alleged in indictment for the entire conspiracy; appellate
court's review of defendant's questioning of the probation officer led court to determine
that the report lacked sufficient indicia of reliability and thus sentence was vacated and
case was remanded for resentencing); United States v. Leichtnam, 948 F.2d 370, 381-82
(7th Cir. 1991) (sentence vacated and case remanded for resentencing by reviewing court
which noted that information in the presentence report regarding drug quantity had been
supplied by government attorney and was totally unsubstantiated).
254 See Silets & Brenner, supra note 220, at 1079. The preliminary draft of the guide-
lines established the burden of proof at sentencing as the preponderance of the evidence
standard. Id. Although the Commission later decided to allow courts to determine the
proper burden of proof, two critics of the preliminary draft recognized that the preponder-
ance of the evidence standard, which is the de facto standard today, "puts the defendant in
a perilous position." Id. at 1083.
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B. The Use of Hearsay
Hearsay 55 evidence has raised the greatest concern with reliabil-
ity of evidence at sentencing. At trial using hearsay may be prohibited
by the Confrontation Clause or the Due Process Clause of the Consti-
tution or by the Federal Rules of Evidence.25 6 The exclusion of hear-
say at trial, under a constitutional rationale, is not completely
coextensive with the exclusions of the Federal Rules of Evidence,
although both trace their origins to the concern in England with the
unfaimess of prosecution by affidavit.257 Recent Confrontation
Clause cases have permitted out-of-court statements that meet "firmly
rooted exceptions" to the hearsay rule.258 Thus, a right of confronta-
tion at sentencing afforded either by the Constitution or by applica-
tion of the rules of evidence would provide similar, although not
identical, protection against unreliable hearsay.
The concern over hearsay stems from the widely accepted belief
that cross-examination can reveal infirmities in testimony that arise
from: (1) defects in perception, (2) defects in memory, (3) defects in
sincerity or veracity, and (4) defects in narration, such as ambiguity. 259
Secondary reasons given for excluding hearsay are that the declarant
is not under oath and the declarant's demeanor cannot be ob-
served.260 The Federal Rules of Evidence contain a definition of hear-
say, a general ban on the use of hearsay, and twenty-nine exceptions
to the exclusion, including "catch-all" exceptions.261 The rules were
designed to admit hearsay only when it arose in circumstances that
support its reliability by identifiable guarantees of trustworthiness. 262
Consequently, as Judge Edward Becker and Professor Aviva Orenstein
aptly noted, inadmissible, reliable hearsay is an "oxymoron."263
255 Hearsay is commonly defined as an out of court statement offered for the truth of
the matter asserted. FED. R. EvrD. 801(c).
256 FED. R. Evm. 801-05.
257 This history was recently recounted by justice Thomas in Illinois v. White, 112 S. Ct.
736, 743-48 (1992) (Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in the decision).
258 See, e.g., Bourjaily v. United States, 483 U.S. 171, 183 (1987) ("co-conspirator excep-
tion to the hearsay rule is firmly enough rooted in ourjurisprudence that... a court need
not independently inquire into the reliability of such statements").
259 LiLLY, supra note 70, at 159.
260 Id. at 160.
261 FED. R. EVID. 801-04.
262 For example, statements for purposes of medical diagnosis or treatment are admit-
ted under an exception to the hearsay rule. FED. R. Evm. 803(4). The premise is that an
individual will truthfully state medical conditions in order to receive appropriate medical
care.
263 Edward R. Becker & Aviva Orenstein, The Federal Rules of Evidence After Sixteen
Years-The Effect of "Plain Meaning"Jurisprudence, The Need for an Advisory Committee on the
Rules of Evidence, and Suggestions for Selective Revision of the Rules, 60 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 857,
889 (1992).
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The Federal Rules of Evidence, other than the single rule gov-
erning privileges, explicitly do not apply to sentencing.26 4 The Fed-
eral Sentencing Guidelines assume that hearsay will still be permitted,
as it was under pre-guidelines discretionary sentencing.265 Accord-
ingly, courts anxious for improved reliability of evidence at sentencing
have looked for a constitutional basis to exclude hearsay.
Courts assessing whether a right of confrontation exists at sen-
tencing have looked to the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amend-
ment and the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. Because
the Supreme Court had concluded that sentencing based on hearsay
did not violate the right to confrontation under pre-guidelines discre-
tionary sentencing in Williams v. New Yok, 266 defendants or courts
seeking a different result at guidelines sentencing had to emphasize
its differences from discretionary sentencing. Making such a distinc-
tion did not appear to be an insurmountable hurdle, because the Wil-
Hams Court's analysis was inextricably linked to the rehabilitative
theory underlying discretionary sentencing. The Williams Court em-
phasized that sentencing courts needed full information about the de-
fendant in order to meet the goal of rehabilitative punishment.2 67
The Court also recognized that the benefits to the defendant under
rehabilitative sentencing were significant, including more lenient pen-
alties.2 68 In Williams, the Court also emphasized that the defendant
had not challenged the veracity of the hearsay information contained
in the presentence report.269
Despite the significant changes in sentencing, most courts have
held that guidelines sentencing is not so different from discretionary
sentencing as to warrant a different analysis of the confrontation or
due process right to preclude hearsay.270 Judicial consideration of the
issue, however, has revealed sharply divergent views. Two federal ap-
pellate court panels held that there was a right to confrontation at
some sentencings.271 En banc courts reversed both of these cases with
strong dissents demonstrating the deep disagreement about the pre-
clusion of hearsay.
264 FED. R. EVID. 1101(d) (3).
265 See supra note 193 and accompanying text.
266 337 U.S. 241 (1949).
267 Id. at 247.
268 Id.
269 Id. at 244.
270 United States v. Sciarrino, 884 F.2d 95, 96-97 (3d Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S.
997 (1989).
271 United States v. Silverman, 945 F.2d 1337 (6th Cir. 1991), vacated, 976 F.2d 1502
(6th Cir. 1992) (en banc), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1595 (1993); United States v. Wise, 923
F.2d 86 (8th Cir. 1991), vacated, 976 F.2d 393 (8th Cir. 1992) (en banc), cert. denied, 113 S.
Ct. 1592 (1993).
1994]
CORNELL LAW REVIEW
In United States v. Silverman,272 the Sixth Circuit, en banc, re-
viewed sentences that were founded on determinations of relevant
conduct based on hearsay. 273 The majority upheld the sentences, con-
cluding that the standards of Williams controlled, and that the use of
hearsay did not violate the confrontation clause or the due process
clause.274 The court noted that other Sixth Amendment guarantees,
such as the right to jury trial, are not available at sentencing.275
In a vigorous dissent, Chief Judge Merritt argued that Williams
was inapplicable to the guidelines sentencing scheme:
[T] he new system completely changes the discretionary, nonadver-
sary, nonfactual nature of the sentencing process by introducing the
adversary sentencing hearing, the need for precise and accurate
findings of disputed facts about other criminal conduct and abso-
lute rules to be applied without deviation requiring the district
court to increase dramatically the sentence based on the uncon-
victed conduct.27 6
Merritt analogized guideline sentencing for relevant conduct to the
enhanced sentencing system examined in Specht v. Patterson,277 where
the Supreme Court refused to extend the Williams rationale to a novel
and substantively different sentencing system. Merritt argued that the
Specht holding required application of the confrontation clause wher-
ever that "[sentencing] scheme requires fact-finding in an adversary
setting"278 and "the sentence is based in part on multiple hearsay."279
In United States v. Wise,280 the Eighth Circuit sitting en banc con-
sidered the procedural requirement at guidelines sentencing, again in
the context of an increased sentence based on alleged relevant con-
duct.28 1 The trial court had relied on hearsay evidence in finding that
there was relevant conduct.282 A panel of the Eighth Circuit reversed
the trial court for failing to evaluate whether the reliance on hearsay
violated the confrontation clause.283 The en banc court reversed the
272 976 F.2d 1502 (6th Cir. 1992) (en banc), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1595 (1993).
273 Id. at 1503.
274 Id. at 1508-11. Judge Nelson concurred in the judgment, but argued that hearsay
should be admitted if it met the "probable accuracy" test mentioned in U.S.S.G., supra note
10, § 6A1.3(a). Id. at 1517 (Nelson, J., concurring).
275 Id. at 1511. For an argument that there should be a right to jury determination of
facts that determine a defendant's sentence, see Colleen P. Murphy, Integrating the Constitu-
tional Authority of Civil and Criminalfuries, 61 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 723, 773-77 (1993).
276 Silverman, 976 F.2d at 1525 (Merritt, CJ., dissenting).
277 386 U.S. 605 (1967).
278 Silverman, 976 F.2d at 1526 (Merritt, C.J., dissenting).
279 Id.
280 976 F.2d 393 (8th Cir. 1992) (en banc), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1592 (1993).
281 Id. at 396.
282 Id.
283 Id. at 395.
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panel and affirmed the sentence.284 Although the problem of hearsay
was not critical to the court's decision, the opinion noted that neither
a right to confrontation nor due process limited the trial court's con-
sideration of evidence at sentencing.28 5
The importance of having testimony subject to cross-examination
as the basis for sentencing is illustrated in United States v. Simmons,286 a
case in which a court had the opportunity to review the actual witness'
testimony. In Simmons, the appellate court reviewed evidence relied
upon by the trial court to determine the quantity of drugs distributed
by Simmons' codefendant, Bowers.287 The trial court relied in part on
testimony from Pierce, a customer of Bowers. Pierce testified that she
had bought between one tenth and one gram of cocaine base from
Bowers on more than twenty occasions. 288
During Pierce's cross-examination, however, the defense estab-
lished that Pierce had committed perjury by testifying falsely about
her own extensive use of crack.289 Also, when repeatedly questioned
about her drug dealings with the defendant, she answered inconsis-
tently and imprecisely, admitting that the events "ran together."290
The appellate court concluded that Pierce's testimony was not reliable
and could not be a factor in determining the quantity of drugs distrib-
uted by Bowers. 291 Because the presentence report had relied on
Pierce's statement, the appellate court vacated Bowers' sentence and
remanded for a further factual hearing to determine the quantity of
drugs distributed by Bowers.292
Simmons demonstrates the importance of firsthand testimony.
Had Pierce not testified at trial, the prosecutor probably would have
reported her information to the probation officer writing the
presentence report. If the quantity had been challenged by the defen-
dant, the government most likely would have asked an officer or agent
who had interviewed Pierce to testify as to what she had said. The
government would not have been obligated to put Pierce on the
stand. There would have been no perjury. The officer undoubtedly
would have been consistent and confident in answering questions. In
assessing the credibility of witnesses for the prosecution and the de-
fense, the court would have had a clean-cut government agent on one
284 Id. at 405.
285 Id. at 400.04.
286 964 F.2d 763 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 632 (1992).
287 Id. at 771.
288 Id.
289 Id. at 769.
290 Id. at 776.
291 Id.
292 Id&
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side and a defendant convicted of distributing large quantities of nar-
cotics on the other.
When hearsay is presented by an agent or in the presentence re-
port, the court has no opportunity to assess demeanor, consistency of
the informant's story, bias, or general credibility. Instead the court
relinquishes to the government or the probation officer its opportu-
nity to judge the credibility of the actual witness to the alleged crimi-
nal conduct. As a result, the witness is never questioned under oath
or cross-examined by an adversary.293
Although hearsay was routinely relied on in pre-guidelines discre-
tionary sentencing, judges had wide discretion to treat hearsay as they
chose. As noted earlier, one judge has written that, under discretion-
ary sentencing, judges usually omitted from consideration facts in the
presentence report that the defendant denied, such as hearsay state-
ments.294 Clearly, however, neither statute nor case law required such
omissions. At a minimum, under discretionary sentencing a judge
could give evidence less weight if it seemed less reliable. The actual
impact of hearsay at discretionary sentencing usually could not be de-
termined because judges did not have to state the reasons for their
sentences. Because hearsay was an acceptable basis for pre-guidelines
discretionary sentencing, courts reluctant to permit it at guidelines
sentencing must distinguish between the two sentencing schemes.
Despite the importance of firsthand testimony, as demonstrated
in Simmons, and some persuasive dissents in circuit courts' en banc
opinions, recent cases indicate that most federal courts are unlikely to
preclude reliance on hearsay at most guidelines sentencings. 295 Ac-
cordingly, preventing consideration of unreliable hearsay must be
achieved by other means.
C. Specialized Rules
Courts have varied dramatically in their determinations of eviden-
tiary issues at sentencing. This variation is consistent with the practice
under pre-guidelines discretionary sentencing, in which courts deter-
mined their own procedures for sentencing. Thus, for example, with
no statutory or recognized constitutional rule against the use of hear-
say at sentencing, most courts have accepted it and have required only
some minimal indicia of reliability.296 Similarly, most courts have con-
293 Reliance on hearsay by an agent is routine and much less troublesome at some
points in criminal proceedings, such as a preliminary hearing, because the decision will be
reevaluated by a grand jury and later by a judge or jury.
294 United States v. Clark, 792 F. Supp. 637, 649 (E.D. Ark. 1992).
295 See cases cited supra this section.
296 See United States v. Query, 928 F.2d 383, 384-85 (11th Cir. 1991) (hearsay evidence
may be relied upon to establish quantity of drugs involved so long as defendant has the
opportunity to rebut the evidence); United States v. Holmes, 961 F.2d 599, 603 (6th Cir.),
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tinued to judge the evidence under a mere preponderance of the evi-
dence standard.297 However, some courts have developed, explicitly
or implicitly, specialized evidentiary rules for sentencing. Scholars
have also suggested specialized rules.
Many of the specialized rules developed through case law are
designed to guide courts in deciding whether to rely on hearsay. For
example, some courts have placed the burden on the defendant to
show that the declarant lacked personal knowledge or had a reason to
lie.29 8 Other courts have placed a more general burden on defend-
ants to rebut hearsay.299 If the defendant fails to rebut the hearsay,
the court accepts it as true.300 This shifting of the burden, however, is
contrary to the principle at trial that the government has the burden
of proof on each element of the offense.a 0' In the context of relevant
conduct, the rule requires the defendant to prove the negative, that is,
that the defendant did not engage in the alleged conduct.30 2 Shifting
the burden does not establish the reliability of the initial hearsay; in-
stead, it permits the court to suggest that the defendant has control of
whether or not the hearsay is credited. This illusion hides the under-
lying, critical need for reliable information in sentencing.
Although most courts have been reluctant to impose a higher
burden of proof or to prohibit hearsay at sentencing, some courts
have explicitly acknowledged their concerns with the potential unreli-
ability of hearsay and have imposed rules regarding the adequacy of
the hearsay evidence.303 Some reviewing courts have required an ex-
cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 232 (1992); United States v. Chavez, 947 F.2d 742, 746 (5th Cir.
1991); United States v. Griffin, 945 F.2d 378, 381-82 (1lth Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct.
1958 (1992); United States v. Shewmaker, 936 F.2d 1124, 1129 (10th Cir. 1991), cert. denied,
112 S. Ct. 884 (1992); United States v. Hubbard, 929 F.2d 307, 309-10 (7th Cir.), cert. de-
nied, 112 S. Ct. 206 (1991); United States v. Sciarrino, 884 F.2d 95, 96-97 (3d Cir.), cert.
denied, 493 U.S. 997 (1989).
297 See supra note 218 and accompanying text.
298 See, e.g., United States v. Aymelek, 926 F.2d 64, 68 (1st Cir. 1991).
299 See United States v. Corbin, 998 F.2d 1377 (7th Cir. 1993); United States v. Addison,
1993 WL 318780 (6th Cir. 1993) (per curiam); United States v. Chavez, 947 F.2d 742, 746-
47 (5th Cir. 1991); United States v. Griffin, 945 F.2d 378, 381-82 (11th Cir. 1991), cert.
denied, 112 S. Ct. 1958 (1992); United States v. Hubbard, 929 F.2d 307, 309-10 (7th Cir.),
cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 206 (1991).
300 See, e.g., United States v. Streich, 987 F.2d 104, 107 (2d Cir. 1993) (per curiam)
(stating that the defendant's failure to contest a presentence report's hearsay allegations,
which were based on interviews with informants, meant that sentencing court could accept
the allegations as true).
301 In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970).
302 See infra note 342 and accompanying text.
303 See, e.g., United States v. Miele, 989 F.2d 659, 664 (3d Cir. 1993) (arguing that the
sufficient indicia of reliability standard "should be applied rigorously").
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planation of why hearsay is reliable. 304 In United States v. Padilla,30 5 the
Tenth Circuit required that the hearsay source be named.30 6 Other
courts have required corroboration of additional criminal conduct by
other evidence.30 7
Each of these rules incrementally improves the factual basis for
sentencing and reflects how people commonly deal with hearsay in
nonlegal matters. Requesting an explanation for why hearsay is relia-
ble essentially asks the proffering party, why do you believe this? Re-
quiring that the ource be named may permit the defense to argue why
that particular individual should not be believed. Requiring corrobo-
ration of hearsay enables the court to base its fact-finding in part on
the other evidence.
Under the Federal Rules of Evidence, these incremental require-
ments would not suffice for admissibility. Hearsay that does not meet
an exception may not be used for substantive evidence. 308 Bolstering
hearsay with corroborating physical evidence or testimony does not
make it admissible.30 9
The Federal Rules of Evidence treat the admissibility of evidence
and the weight the fact-finder chooses to give that evidence as sepa-
rate determinations. The rules concerning hearsay initially ensure
that each piece of evidence admitted has sufficient reliability to be a
factor in fact-finding. 310 At sentencing, however, decisions of admissi-
bility and weight are essentially merged.
304 See United States v. Ortiz, 993 F.2d 204, 208 (10th Cir. 1993) (finding that the
district court sentence was clearly erroneous for relying upon FBI agent's testimony which
was based solely on the uncorroborated, out-of-court statement of a confidential
informant).
305 947 F.2d 893 (10th Cir. 1991).
306 Id. at 895-96.
307 See, e.g., United States v. Hubbard, 929 F.2d 307, 309-10 (7th Cir.) (finding that
hearsay evidence of intent to cause bodily injury was corroborated by physical evidence),
cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 206 (1991); United States v. Zuleta-Alvarez, 922 F.2d 33, 36-37 (1st
Cir. 1990) (stating that hearsay evidence of drug quantity was corroborated by other wit-
ness' testimony at grand jury and trial), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 2039 (1991).
308 FED. R. EVID. 802.
309 The Federal Rules of Evidence provide that a hearsay statement which does not fall
within a specified exception, but has "equivalent circumstantial guarantees of trustworthi-
ness," may be admitted if the court determines that
(A) the statement is offered as evidence of a material fact; (B) the
statement is more probative on the point for which it is offered than any
other evidence which the proponent can procure through reasonable ef-
forts; and (C) the general purposes of these rules and the interests ofjus-
tice will best be served by admission of the statement into evidence.
FED. R. EvrD. 803(24); see also FED. R. EvID. 804(5) (same).
310 FED. R Evm. 801-803. In addition to rules governing hearsay, other Federal Rules
of Evidence impose standards of reliability. See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 602 (prohibiting testi-
mony if witness lacks personal knowledge of the matter of the testimony); FED. R. EvID. 701
(limiting opinion testimony by lay witnesses); FED. R. EvID. 702 (allowing opinion testi-
mony by expert witness only if that witness possesses knowledge, skill, experience, training,
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Some courts have not explicitly acknowledged their concerns
about reliability, but have demonstrated them by "discounting" the
facts as established by hearsay evidence. Discounting occurs when a
judge makes a finding that a specific amount of harm-such as a spe-
cific quantity of drug distribution-has been established by a prepon-
derance of the evidence, but the judge nevertheless bases the
sentence on a lesser amount. This implicit weighing of hearsay can
occur when the testimony about the quantity of drugs is necessarily an
estimate because the full quantity was not seized. A court may elect to
err on the side of caution by taking the smallest amount stated and
multiplying it by the number of transactions. 31'
Sometimes the discounting is more extreme. Substantial dis-
counting may suggest that the court is not persuaded about the quan-
tity, despite the evidence. For example, in United States v. Epstein,3 12 a
jury convicted Epstein of conspiring to possess with the intent to dis-
tribute cocaine.313 He was acquitted of a charge of attempting to pos-
sess with the intent to distribute two kilograms of cocaine.3 14 The
government estimated that Epstein and his coconspirator distributed
between fifteen and seventeen kilograms of cocaine.315 At the sen-
tencing, the court reached two critical factual conclusions. First, the
court concluded that the coconspirator's "testimony was sufficiently
credible to establish the amount of cocaine sold by the defendant."31 6
Next, the court conceded that the coconspirator might have overesti-
mated the quantity and noted that the coconspirator's testimony was
not totally corroborated.317 The court then discounted the quantity
by fifty percent and held Epstein accountable for distributing between
seven and a half and eight and a half kilograms of cocaine.318
Epstein suggests the discomfort some trial judges experience with
low standards of reliability for evidence. One could argue that if the
trial court was so uncomfortable it should have found that the evi-
or education regarding the subject about which the witness would testify); FED. R EVID.
901 (providing for authentication or identification of evidence as a "condition precedent
to admissibility"); FED. R. Evm. 1002 (generally requiring the original of a writing, record-
ing, or photograph to prove the contents thereof).
311 See, e.g., United States v. Montoya, 967 F.2d 1 (lst Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 507
(1992). A DEA agent testified at Montoya's sentencing that a government informant had
reported purchasing two to five ounces of cocaine per week from Montoya for three
months. The court sentenced Montoya for selling only two ounces of cocaine per week for
the twelve week period. Id. at 4.
312 United States v. Epstein, No. 89-CR809-2, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 541 (N.D. Ill. Jan.
15, 1992).
313 Id. at *4.
314 Id.
315 Id.
316 Id. at *8.
317 Id. at *10.
318 Id, at *10-11.
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dence lacked sufficient indicia of reliability. Instead, this court seems
to have done what was possible before guidelines-weighted evidence
without wholly accepting or rejecting what was proffered.319
The application of ad hoc rules by different judges in different
cases raises the possibility of disparities that the guidelines were specif-
ically intended to minimize.3 20 When one judge discounts hearsay evi-
dence about quantity by fifty percent and another does not,
defendants may receive dramatically different sentences for similar
crimes. While this compromise accounting may resolve the issue in an
individual case, it works against the guidelines' goal of avoiding un-
warranted or unnecessary disparity in sentencing.
Commentators have also advocated that specialized rules be ap-
plied to sentencing, both with respect to burdens of proof and to the
admissibility of evidence. 321 Some have urged the adoption of a
higher burden of proof at sentencing. Judy Clarke has argued, as did
the dissenting judges in United States v. Restrepo,322 that proof beyond a
reasonable doubt should be required for criminal conduct that was
not part of the offense of conviction.323 She has also argued that the
clear and convincing standard should apply to more traditional sen-
tencing factors. 324
Professor Margaret Berger has proposed three limitations on the
use of hearsay at sentencing: first, prohibiting use of hearsay state-
ments by cooperating individuals to prove relevant conduct; second,
requiring corroboration for hearsay at sentencing; and third, limiting
admissibility of multiple hearsay.325 These proposed rules directly ad-
319 The Epstein decision highlights one benefit of the guidelines scheme. Because the
guideline require courts to present their reasoning, the Epstein court was forced to reveal
how it had weighted the evidence. As discussed in part I of this Article, the pre-guidelines
sentencing system allowed judges to sentence without expressly stating what factors moti-
vated the sentence. In contrast to the former system, the guidelines' mandatory disclosure
of reasoning invites scrutiny and analysis, which facilitate improvements to the guidelines.
320 Congress specifically directed the Sentencing Commission to establish sentencing
policies with the purpose of "avoiding unwarranted sentencing disparities among defend-
ants with similar records who have been found guilty of similar criminal conduct." 28
U.S.C. § 991(b) (1) (B) (1988).
321 See Becker & Orenstein, supra note 263, at 890-91; Margaret A. Berger, Rethinking
the Applicability of Evidentiary Rules at Sentencing: Of Relevant Conduct and Hearsay and the Need
for an Infield Fy Rule, 5 FED. SENTENcING REP. 96 (1992); Judy Clarke, The Need for a Higher
Burden of Prooffor Fact Finding Under the Guidelines, 4 FED. SENTENCNG REPs. 300 (1992).
322 946 F.2d 654, 663 (9th Cir. 1991) (en banc) (Pregerson,J., dissenting), cert. denied,
112 S. Ct. 1564 (1992).
323 Clarke, supra note 321, at 302.
324 Id.
325 Berger, supra note 321, at 99. Berger also argues that the government should not
be permitted to relitigate at sentencing a count on which a defendant was acquitted. This
suggestion to prohibit evidence of acquitted counts is consistent with the Ninth Circuit's
reasoning in United States v. Brady, 928 F.2d 844, 851-52 (9th Cir. 1991), that it is im-
proper to penalize a defendant for conduct which was the basis for an acquittal. Along the
same vein, Berger proposes an "infield fly rule" that would prohibit the government from
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dress the reliability and accuracy of fact-finding by targeting some of
the most common and troubling kinds of hearsay used at sentencing.
Excluding hearsay by cooperating individuals would eliminate a com-
mon source of hearsay about the defendant's relevant conduct and
role in the offense. Yet, this proposed rule does not address the very
similar testimony by paid informants. Furthermore, as Berger points
out, hearsay statements by cooperating individuals are often excluded
under the Federal Rules of Evidence.326
Requiring corroboration of hearsay, consistent with some judicial
rulings, raises the level of reliability, but does not address the underly-
ing problem that occurs when part of the evidence is unreliable. Simi-
larly, limiting multiple hearsay means that the testifying witness judges
the credibility of the actual declarant, rather than another individual
who reported to the in-court witness. This requirement still precludes
the court from making its own assessment about the declarant's per-
ception, narration, and sincerity.
Judge Edward Becker and Professor Aviva Orenstein have gone
one step further, suggesting that the Supreme Court, acting through
an Advisory Committee of the Rules of Evidence, amend the eviden-
tiary rules to make selected rules applicable at sentencing.32 7
Each of these suggestions demonstrates the general concern with
the inadequacy of existing procedural safeguards for guidelines sen-
tencing. Each attempts to improve the accuracy of fact-finding in at
least some cases or to shift the burden of proof so that an erroneous
decision is less likely to harm a defendant. Adopting piece-meal rules,
however, fails to recognize the fundamental concern that a defendant
should be sentenced based on reliable evidence. Specialized rules
achieve some desired results, such as limiting the sentencing increases
for relevant conduct, but they fail to recognize that the substantive
question of what constitutes relevant conduct and the evidentiary
question of what is reliable evidence are best addressed separately. If
there is a consensus that defendants should be sentenced on reliable
evidence, then Congress and the federal judiciary should look for a
comprehensive solution.
introducing evidence at sentencing of dropped or previously uncharged crimes. Berger,
supra note 321, at 99. These suggestions may be viewed as substantive rules which address
how relevant conduct should be defined, rather than how to accurately and reliably deter-
mine relevant conduct. They would greatly limit new evidence of relevant conduct at
sentencing.
326 Berger, supra note 321, at 99.
327 Becker & Orenstein, supra note 263, at 909-14.
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III
A NEW EXPLORATION OF FACT-FINDNG AT SENTENCING
Despite the courts' substantial attention to guidelines fact-find-
ing, the goal of increased reliability in fact-finding at sentencing has
not been attained. A fundamental reason for this failure is the mis-
taken reliance on pre-guidelines cases to determine guideline proce-
dures.328 A different approach is necessary.
This section analyzes procedures for fact-finding at guidelines
sentencing according to theories of evidence. The analysis evaluates
two evidentiary protections with important differences: the impact of
raising the burden of proof and the impact of requiring more reliable
evidence at sentencing. The analysis then evaluates the extent to
which these protections advance the sometimes inconsistent goals of
achieving accuracy in fact-finding and not unfairly burdening defend-
ants with errors. Factors affecting this evaluation include the likeli-
hood that evidence offered at sentencing will be inculpatory and the
probability that evidence will be false. The loss of discretion by judges
in the sentencing process exacerbates the problem of unjust fact-find-
ing because judges can no longer ameliorate the harsh effects of low
standards of reliability and proof at sentencing. The section con-
cludes by outlining appropriate procedures for reliable fact-finding at
guidelines sentencing.
A. Raising the Burden of Proof
Raising the burden of proof is often considered as a way to im-
prove the reliability of fact-finding at sentencing.3 29 However, raising
the burden of proof does not guarantee greater accuracy in sentenc-
ing determinations. Indeed, as illustrated below, raising the burden
of proof may result in fewer accurate outcomes. The benefit to the
defendant is that the government bears more of the errors in sentenc-
ing decisions if the government has a higher burden.
The impact of changing the burden of proof may be demon-
strated by looking at the determination of guilt or innocence and eval-
uating how outcomes change if the burden of proof is lowered.
Assume a null hypothesis that the defendant is guilty. For each defen-
dant, one of two possibilities is correct: The defendant is guilty or the
defendant is innocent. For each defendant, the jury will either acquit
or convict. Assume the following results in 400 cases where the gov-
ernment's burden of proof is guilt beyond a reasonable doubt:
328 See discussion supra Part II.
329 See, e.g., David N. Adair, Jr., House Built on a Weak Foundation--Sentencing Guidelines
and the Preponderance Standard of Proof 4 FED. SENTENCING REP. 292 (1992).
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Jury Convicts Jury Acquits
DEFENDANT IS 220 80
GUILTY (300 X) (correct) (Type I error)
DEFENDANT IS 10 90
INNOCENT (100 X) (Type II error) (correct)
Under the assumptions used,330 there are ninety errors. Only ten of
these errors are instances in which the hypothesis is false, but ac-
cepted, referred to in statistics as a Type II error.33' In this example,
these ten Type II errors are instances of convicting the innocent. The
other eighty errors are Type I errors, in which the hypothesis is true,
but falsely rejected.3 32 These eighty Type I errors represent guilty de-
fendants who are acquitted.
Now, assume the burden of proof is lowered to a preponderance
of the evidence, which results in an increase in convictions.
Jury Convicts Jury Acquits
DEFENDANT IS 256 44
GUILTY (300 X) (correct) (Type I error)
DEFENDANT IS 15 85
INNOCENT (100 X) (Type II error) (correct)
There are now fifty-nine errors, a reduction of thirty-one errors. How-
ever, fifteen of the errors are now Type II errors, representing inno-
cent defendants who are convicted.
For determinations of guilt or innocence, a higher burden of
proof means that the number of Type II errors decreases, despite the
fact that the total number of errors increases. The principle used to
justify the high burden is commonly cited as, "[i] t is far worse to con-
vict an innocent man than to let a guilty man go free."333
330 These numbers are hypothetical. The numbers in this and in the next chart illus-
trate the principle that the number of convictions will increase as the burden of proof is
lowered.
331 JOHN FREUND & GARY SIMON, MODERN ELEMENTARY STATISTICS 301 (1992).
332 1&
333 Justice Harlan stated this principle in his concurring opinion in In re Winship, 397
U.S. 358, 372 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring). He further noted that:
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The questions of whether and how standards at sentencing
should be raised can only be answered if one identifies what kind of
error is most problematic. For example, the sentencing factor that
has received the most attention with regard to the burden of proof is
relevant conduct.3 34 Many commentators have urged that the burden
of proof should be at least clear and convincing for relevant conduct
that will substantially affect a defendant's sentence. 335 Those who
urge a higher burden of proof are actually lobbying for more total
errors, but fewer Type II errors. Because the government has the bur-
den of proof for relevant conduct, juries will find fewer defendants to
have committed relevant conduct that they did not in fact commit, as
is the case with the guilt determination at trial. However, more de-
fendants who did commit relevant conduct will be found not to have
done so, resulting in an increase in total errors.336
Historically, one reason given for the lack of procedural protec-
tions at sentencing was that, after conviction, the defendant should no
longer be given the benefit of the doubt; the government and the
defendant should equally bear the risk of inaccuracy at sentencing.33 7
As long as the burden of proof is on one party, however, there will not
be actual equality. That is, even with a preponderance of the evidence
standard, if the evidence is fifty-fifty, the party with the burden of
proof loses. Nevertheless, the preponderance of the evidence stan-
dard does present the most equal consequences possible. The ques-
tion, then, is whether producing fewer total errors is preferable to
more total errors with fewer borne by the defendant.
In each instance of shifting the burden there is a cost. When the
guilty go free because of the beyond a reasonable doubt standard at
trial, criminals who may victimize others are free to return to the com-
munity. The Constitution requires this cost, rather than convicting
It is only because of the nearly complete and long-standing acceptance of
the reasonable-doubt standard by the States in criminal trials that the Court
has not before today had to hold explicitly that due process, as an expres-
sion of fundamental procedural fairness, requires a more stringent stan-
dard for criminal trials than for ordinary civil litigation.
Id.
334 See supra note 323. For a listing of several articles critical of the treatment of rele-
vant 'conduct under the guidelines, see supra note 159.
335 Clarke, supra note 321, at 302; Husseini, supra note 16.
336 This analysis assumes that the same evidence will be presented under either burden
of proof. This assumption, however, is likely to be inaccurate for sentencings. Because the
burden on the government at sentencings now is so low, both as stated and as applied, the
government has little incentive to present substantial evidence. If the burden of proof
were raised for sentencings, an indirect result might be that the parties would present
more and better evidence. This in turn could result in more accurate sentencing
decisions.
337 Kadish, supra note 22, at 254-55.
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more innocent defendants. 338 Adjusting the burden of proof for a
sentencing factor also has costs. Raising the burden of proof for rele-
vant evidence will result in more total errors, but fewer defendants
who are innocent of the relevant conduct will be punished for it. The
increase in total errors means that more defendants who have com-
mitted identical conduct will receive different sentences, contrary to
the goal of reducing disparity, and that more defendants will not be
punished for the full harm that they committed. Thus, the choice in
burdens of proof is a choice between these costs.
Because sentencing for additional relevant conduct seems so sim-
ilar to convicting for criminal conduct, one might conclude that the
choice of which costs to bear should be the same. Yet, with other
factors the goal may more clearly be one of accuracy, reflected by
fewer total errors, rather than shifting more of the errors to one party.
If so, then the lesser burden of preponderance of evidence is
appropriate.
Even once the burden of proof is specified, such as by a prepon-
derance of the evidence, courts may not actually apply the standard in
the same way. There are two possible, but different, applications of
the preponderance standard: either the evidence convinces the fact
finder that the proposition is more likely than not, or the weight of
the evidence, no matter how slight the total evidence, is in favor of the
proponent.33 9 The distinction between these applications is critical.
The first application may impose a higher standard for the degree of
certainty of the ultimate proposition. Under this application, even if
the proponent presents substantially more evidence (qualitatively and
quantitatively), the proponent will still lose if the fact-finder does not
believe that the proponent has established that the proposition is
338 In explaining why the beyond a reasonable doubt standard is the correct one at
criminal trials, the Court has stated that "the interests of the defendant are of such magni-
tude ... they have been protected by standards of proof designed to exclude as nearly as
possible the likelihood of an erroneous judgment. In the administration of criminal jus-
tice, our society imposes almost the entire risk upon itself." Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S.
418, 423-24 (1979).
339 V. C. Ball stated this difference as follows:
In civil cases, putting aside certain special types, the finding must be based
upon "a preponderance of the evidence." At this point the courts divide.
One group treats this latter term as meaning any preponderance, while
others require that the preponderance be a "fair" one, or that the jury "be-
lieve in the truth" of the fact, or be "satisfied" or "convinced."
V. C. Ball, The Moment of Truth: Probability Theory and Standards of Proof 14 VAND. L. REV.
807, 808 (1961).
Justice Harlan also expressed concern about the two possible interpretations of the
preponderance burden of proof: "The preponderance test has been criticized, justifiably
in my view, when it is read as asking the trier of fact to weigh in some objective sense the
quantity of evidence submitted by each side rather than asking him to decide what he
believes most probably happened." In Re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 371 n.3 (1970) (Harlan,
J., concurring).
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more likely than not.340 Under the second application, the propo-
nent would win.
Obviously differing applications of the same burden of proof may
be a problem at the guilt phase as well as at sentencing. But there are
several reasons why defining the burden of proof may pose a more
significant problem with fact-finding at sentencing. First, courts are
not accustomed to having to apply any burden of proof in sentencing
decisions.3 41 At discretionary sentencing, a sentence within the statu-
tory range did not have to be premised on any particular evidence. A
court could impose any sentence within the statutory range based on
little or no evidence.
Second, courts do not routinely make ultimate fact determina-
tions based on evidence that is inadmissible under the Federal Rules
of Evidence. Courts generally apply the preponderance standard to
evidence inadmissible under the Federal Rules of Evidence only when
deciding preliminary matters such as a motion to suppress evidence.
Although a decision regarding suppression is important, it is not final
and can be reconsidered in the course of a trial. Using evidence of
such low reliability in determining ultimate facts aggravates the confu-
sion between the competing conceptions of the preponderance stan-
dard. If all of the evidence under evaluation meets standards of
admissibility under the Federal Rules of Evidence, which ensure some
reliability, then a finding of preponderance of the evidence is also
more likely to be a finding of more likely than not. If, on the other
hand, all of the evidence is hearsay deemed unreliable by the Federal
Rules of Evidence, then a finding of preponderance of the evidence is
less apt to rise to the level of more likely than not.
Third, the unique posture of the parties at sentencing com-
pounds the problem of defining the burden of proof. Frequently, the
government will propose an increased sentence because of specific be-
havior alleged to have been committed by the defendant. The only
defense to the allegation may be to deny the occurrence of the event.
Proving this negative is difficult.3 42 Moreover, the government's evi-
340 Some have assumed that this application is undisputed:
All would agree that what counts is the jury's belief in the existence (or
nonexistence) of the disputed fact, and the extent to which the evidence
actually produces that belief; surely we are not seeking thejury's estimate of
the weight of evidence in the abstract, apart from its power actually to con-
vince or persuade them.
Fleming James, Jr., Burdens of Proof 47 VA. L. REv. 51, 53 (1961).
341 At pre-guidelines discretionary sentencing, no burden of proof was required be-
cause no specific factual determinations were required. See supra note 212 and accompany-
ing text.
342 The problem of proving a negative proposition also arises in civil forfeiture pro-
ceedings aimed at illegal drug activity under 21 U.S.C. § 881. Under that statute, the gov-
erment need only demonstrate probable cause to believe that the property facilitated
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dence is often hearsay presented by a government agent, likely to be
found credible by the court. As a convicted person, the denying de-
fendant is much less likely to be found credible. If the government is
required to have the informant testify in order to have the benefit of
the informant's information, the court can at least judge the credibil-
ity of the informant, rather than relying on the agent's assessment.
Absent such a requirement, courts frequently sentence after weighing
a government agent's testimony of hearsay statements against a con-
victed defendant's denial.343
This situation of inequality between the opposing parties con-
trasts sharply with the common situation in which the burden of pre-
ponderance of the evidence is applied: a civil dispute in which the
opposing parties approach the court as equals without prejudgment
by the court of their likely credibilities. One reason the beyond a rea-
sonable doubt standard is necessary at criminal trials is the imbalance
in favor of the prosecution resulting from the greater credibility
deemed to accompany government witnesses. 344 This imbalance in
favor of the government may be an even more serious problem once
the defendant has lost the cloak of the presumption of innocence, as
is the case at sentencing.
The question presented in this context is: How can a trial court
find such limited evidence, deemed unreliable by the Federal Rules of
Evidence, to establish the relevant conduct as more likely than not?
The outcome may depend on the reliance on a preponderance of the
evidence standard that requires no minimum level of confidence in
illegal drug activity. The owner of the property then has the burden of demonstrating
innocent ownership in order to retain the property. Marc B. Stahl, Asset Forfeiture, Burdens
of Proof and the War on Drugs, 83J. CRiM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 274, 284 (1992). The claimant
must prove a negative: the absence of knowledge of illegal activity. Id. at 288.
343 See, e.g., United States v. McFarland, 1993 WL 72429 (10th Cir. 1993) (government
agent's hearsay testimony concerning amount of drugs credited over defendant's testi-
mony; the reviewing court noted that the government could have called the informant who
had supplied information to the agent, but that in accordance with U.S.S.G., supra note 10,
§ 6A1.3(a), government was not obligated to do so); United States v. Sherbak, 950 F.2d
1095, 1100-01 (5th Cir. 1992) (affirming the district court's decision to credit unswom
statement of Drug Enforcement Agency agent over the defendant's counter-assertions was
upheld); United States v. Griffin, 945 F.2d 378, 381-82 (11th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S.
Ct. 1958 (1992) (concluding that the state agent's testimony, based partly on a confidential
informant's statement classifying drug possessed by defendant as crack cocaine rather than
powder cocaine, was credible because defendant failed to rebut it).
344 Another possible bias is an attempt by courts to please the more powerful of the
represented interests. Richard Higgins & Paul Rubin, Judicial Discretion, 9 J. LEGAL STUD.
129, 130 (1980) (citing RciiAw A. POSNER, EcoNoMIc AALYSIS OF LAiW 416 (2d ed.
1977)). At sentencings, there may be substantial support from victims or law enforcement
personnel for a severe sentence, but there is rarely support for a lesser sentence except
from the defendant's friends and family.
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the decision.3 45 Some courts have suggested that decisions based on
weak evidence such as hearsay are acceptable if the defendant has the
opportunity to rebut the testimony or call any witnesses he or she
chooses.3 46 This approach, however, transforms the government's
burden of proof into the much lighter burden of production. Rather
than having to convince the fact-finder, the government need only
present some evidence with "sufficient indicia of reliability" for its
proposition.3 47 If the defendant fails to present any contradictory evi-
dence, the court finds in favor of the government 3 48 Sometimes this
result occurs even when the defendant has denied the alleged facts.3 49
Applying a higher burden of proof at sentencing would avoid the
problem of a court sentencing a defendant when the court does not
have an abiding conviction of the factual basis for the sentence. The
language "clear and convincing," although not assigned a mathemati-
cal probability, conveys the idea that the fact-finder must do more
than simply weigh which side has the most evidence. However, if the
goals are to minimize error and to ensure that a court bases its deci-
sion on evidence reliable enough to establish that the proposed fact is
more likely than not, a higher burden is unnecessary and may add
confusion while increasing total error.
The level of confidence in a decision is related to both the bur-
den of proof and the reliability of the evidence considered. When the
burden of proof is higher than the preponderance standard, either
clear and convincing or beyond a reasonable doubt, the reliability of
the evidence may not be an issue because the fact-finder's determina-
tion so clearly evinces an abiding belief in the evidence. However,
when there is a possibility that the fact-finder may be evaluating the
evidence on each side and deciding in favor of the party that has bet-
ter evidence, the reliability of the underlying evidence becomes criti-
cal. Absent an adequate standard of reliability, the fact-finder's choice
of which side has the better evidence may not instill confidence about
345 For a discussion on the significance of the burden of proof assigned, see supra part
ILA-
346 E.g., Grzffin, 945 F.2d at 381-82; United States v. Hubbard, 929 F.2d 307, 309-10 (7th
Cir.), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 206 (1991); United States v. Query, 928 F.2d 383, 384-85 (11th
Cir. 1991); United States v. Mir, 919 F.2d 940, 943 (5th Cir. 1990).
347 U.S.S.G., supra note 10, § 6A1.3(a) (stating that a sentencing court "may consider
relevant information without regard to its admissibility under the rules of evidence applica-
ble at trial, provided that the information has sufficient indicia of reliability to support its
probable accuracy").
348 See, e.g., United States v. Mir, 919 F.2d at 943 (concluding that because defendant
failed to offer evidence to rebut presentence report's calculation of the quantity of drugs
and its finding that defendant was a leader in a narcotics conspiracy, district court could
consider these factors into consideration at sentencing).
349 See, e.g., United States v. Query, 928 F.2d 383, 384-85 (11th Cir. 1991) (finding that
the sentencing court accepted hearsay statements although the defendant denied their
accuracy).
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the decision among the participants in or observers of the criminal
justice system.
B. Requiring Reliable Evidence
The appropriateness of imposing limitations on the evidence a
court will hear has long been a matter of debate. Some commentators
contend that a judge, unlike a juror, is fully capable of giving even
unreliable evidence the amount of credit it is due and no more.350
This argument has been offered in support of the proposition that
Federal Rules of Evidence should not apply or should be eased at
bench trials.3 51 The drafters of the Federal Rules of Evidence rejected
this argument.3 52
The impact of considering evidence inadmissible under the Fed-
eral Rules of Evidence cannot be precisely modelled or quantified.353
Even an imprecise model may be of assistance, however, in clarifying
the significance of such evidence. Assume that the government is try-
ing to persuade the sentencing court that a defendant sold an addi-
tional kilogram of cocaine and therefore should receive a longer
sentence. Assume further that the government bears the burden of
proving that fact by a preponderance of the evidence. For the pur-
pose of this hypothetical example, assume that there are two catego-
ries of potential evidence: evidence admissible under the Federal
Rules of Evidence governing reliability ("FRE admissible evidence")
and evidence not admissible under the Federal Rules of Evidence gov-
erning reliability ("FRE inadmissible evidence"). An example of FRE
admissible evidence is an eyewitness who says she saw the defendant
with the drugs. An example of FRE inadmissible evidence is a witness
who heard someone who claimed to be an eyewitness say that she saw
350 Dale A. Nance, The Best Evidence Principle 73 IowA L. REv. 227, 229-30 (1988); Jo-
seph F. Weiss, Jr., Are Courts Obsolete?, 67 NoTRE DAME L. REv. 1385, 1391 (1992).
351 See, e.g.,Joseph F. Weis, Jr., Are Courts Obsolete?, 67 NoTRE DAME L. REv. 1385, 1391
(1992).
352 Rule 1101(a) states that the rules apply to courts and magistrates and makes no
exception for bench trials. FED. R. EviD. 1101(a).
353 One recent research project attempted to measure how much jurors relied on
hearsay. The study had jurors read different trial transcripts, some of which presented
portions of the evidence via hearsay and some of which presented the evidence directly.
The study concluded that there were no significant differences in the frequencies of ver-
dicts among the jurors who read different transcripts. Richard Rakos & Stephen Lands-
man, Researching the Hearsay Rule: Emerging Findings, General Issues, and Future Directions, 76
MmrN. L. REv. 655, 661 (1992). Because a key criticism of hearsay testimony is that the fact-
finder has no opportunity to judge the demeanor of the declarant, studies based on tran-
scripts are insufficient to assess the real concerns of hearsay.
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the defendant with the drugs. Both items of evidence are clearly
relevant.3 54
Consider what happens if the sentencing court only permits the
FRE admissible evidence. Given the limitation, there may be many
cases with little evidence and, because the government bears the bur-
den of proof, there may be many cases where the court will falsely re-
ject the hypothesis that the defendant sold the uncharged kilogram.
This is acceptable because the purpose of the burden is to ensure
there are more falsely rejected hypotheses, where a more culpable de-
fendant receives a more lenient sentence, than falsely accepted hy-
potheses, where a defendant not culpable of distributing the
additional kilogram receives a heavier sentence.
Now consider what happens if all relevant evidence, both FRE
admissible and FRE inadmissible evidence is considered. There
should be fewer errors if one assumes that all evidence is relevant and
more likely to be true than false. But if we add one more assumption,
that almost all evidence at sentencing is inculpatory, the result will be
more false acceptances of the hypothesis that the defendant deserves a
harsher sentence.
To see this more clearly, assume that all FRE inadmissible evi-
dence is inculpatory. This evidence cannot reduce the number of
false rejections, because at best, for the defendants, the evidence will
be disbelieved, leaving the defendants where they started based on the
FRE admissible evidence. Therefore, inculpatory FRE inadmissible ev-
idence can only lead to increased sentences. More often than not-
because the evidence has some expected net probative value-the re-
sult will be that defendants who would otherwise falsely get a lighter
sentence will get the correct, heavier sentence. But on some number
of occasions defendants who would correctly get the lighter sentence
based only on FRE admissible evidence will falsely get a heavier sen-
tence based on incorrect but admitted FRE inadmissible evidence.
As a consequence, admitting FRE inadmissible evidence at sen-
tencing diminishes the significance of the government's burden by
systematically making it easier for the prosecution to obtain a heavier
sentence. If the additional evidence were equally divided between in-
culpatory and exculpatory evidence, admitting it might be justified be-
cause there would be fewer total errors. But, because the evidence is
likely to be inculpatory, there may be fewer total errors only at the
expense of more errors borne by the defendant.
The outcome is even more problematic if FRE inadmissible evi-
dence is much more likely to be false than FRE admissible evidence.
354 Under the Federal Rules of Evidence, evidence is relevant if it has any tendency to
make the existence of a consequential fact more probable or less probable. FED. R. EVID.
401 (1992).
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This seems probable when one considers the nature of information
provided by informants. Assume informant A tells a government
agent that the defendant sold the additional kilogram of heroin. If
the agent believes the information, the agent will tell the prosecu-
tor.35 5 This agent is the only one who had the opportunity to judge
the credibility of the informant. The prosecutor may decide whether
or not to rely on the agent's credibility, but neither the prosecutor
nor the court has an opportunity to judge the informant's credibility.
If the government were required to present FRE admissible evi-
dence,3 56 the agent, the prosecutor and the judge would be able to
assess, first hand, the credibility of the informant. Three levels of
scrutiny are much more likely to find a falsehood or discrepancy than
one. According to the rationale of the rules of evidence, the inform-
ant is also somewhat more likely to tell the truth under oath, subject
to perjury.357
If one accepts the probability that more FRE inadmissible evi-
dence will be false or inaccurate, then a possible result is that there
will be more errors in judging the additional alleged conduct and that
more of these errors will be falsely accepted hypotheses where a non-
culpable defendant receives a heavier sentence.
Such sentencing errors are particularly serious because there is
little chance of correction on appeal.3 58 When FRE inadmissible evi-
dence is permitted, the appellate court will only be able to review the
agent's testimony at the sentencing.3 59 Essentially, this review is one
of sufficiency: absent some glaring inconsistency in the testimony, an
appellate court will not reject the trial court's assessment of
credibility.3 60
This article posits that even with pre-guidelines sentencing, there
should have been more stringent evidentiary standards at sentencing.
To the extent that courts based their sentences in part on specific
355 This analysis assumes that the agents and prosecutors are acting honestly and ethi-
cally. A further problem is that the use of inadmissible evidence makes it more difficult to
identify evidence that an agent or prosecutor has intentionally fabricated or exaggerated.
356 The Sentencing Guidelines now specify that the government need not call in the
actual informant, but instead may simply call the agent who witnessed the informant's
statement. See U.S.S.G., supra note 10, § 6A1.
357 FED. R Evm. Art. VIII (Advisory Committee's Introductory Note: The Hearsay
Problem).
358 Appellate courts review fact-finding at sentencing under a "clearly erroneous" stan-
dard. 18 U.S.C. § 3742(d); see also Braxton v. United States, 111 S. Ct. 1854, 1858 (1991)
(clearly erroneous is proper standard for reviewing district court's finding of fact).
359 For an example and full discussion of the importance of firsthand testimony for
appellate review, see supra note 286 and accompanying text.
360 A district court's assessment of witness credibility will not be disturbed unless it is
"dearly erroneous." 18 U.S.C. § 3742(d); see also United States v. Sarasti, 869 F.2d 805, 807
(5th Cir. 1989) ("[c] redibility determinations are peculiarly within the province of the trier-
of-fact, and we will not disturb the sentencing judge's findings").
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facts, the above analysis applies. There is, however, a potentially more
severe impact from FRE inadmissible evidence at guidelines sentenc-
ing than there was at pre-guidelines sentencing. The sentencing
guidelines do not permit sentencing along a broad spectrum to ac-
commodate varying degrees of reliability of evidence. Once a factor
relevant to the defendant's sentence is alleged by the government or
the defense, the court must make a factual determination. Moreover,
with guidelines sentencing each factual resolution directly affects the
individual's sentence, increasing the importance of the reliability of
the evidence. 361
A secondary effect of heightened evidentiary requirements is that
they encourage parties to seek and obtain more reliable evidence. For
example, if hearsay inadmissible under the rules is not permitted at
sentencing then the party proffering the evidence will try to present
the declarant.A62 The court can then judge the credibility of the de-
clarant and the opposing party can cross-examine the declarant. Ab-
sent some minimal requirement, there is little incentive for the parties
to bring more reliable evidence to the court.
To avoid substantial errors and instill confidence in sentencing
decisions, courts should rely on FRE admissible evidence and should
insist that the evidence establishes that the fact alleged is more likely
true than not.
IV
APPLYING RuLEs OF EVIDENCE AT SENTENCING
Applying the Federal Rules of Evidence governing reliability363 at
sentencing best achieves the goal of improving the reliability of fact-
finding.364 These rules provide consistent standards for the admissi-
bility of evidence among courts and among defendants. Even if courts
did develop their own heightened standards for consideration of evi-
361 As one commentator has noted, using the results of unreliable fact-finding "is like
feeding bad data into a computer. The program may be flawless, and the execution of the
program by the computer may be flawless, but the result will be wrong." Adair, supra note
329, at 294.
362 The commentary to U.S.S.G., supra note 10, § 6A1.3 now allows the government to
present an agent as a witness giving testimony based on hearsay rather than requiring the
government to produce the declarant. See supra note 175.
363 Many of the rules of evidence do not concern the reliability of evidence and would
not be applicable at sentencing. For example, Rule 105 relates only to an instruction to a
jury regarding limited admissibility. FED. R. EvID. 105. Rules 301 and 302 regulate the use
of presumptions only in civil cases. FED. R EvD. 301-02. Rule 407 concerns subsequent
remedial measures, which are not a relevant issue at sentence. FED. R. EviD. 401. Rule 408
relates to offers to compromise only in civil cases. FED. R. EvID. 408.
364 The idea of applying rules of evidence at sentencings proceedings is neither new
nor untested. Rules of evidence have been applied at sentencing hearings in the military,
M. R. EvID. 1101(c), and in state proceedings. The experiences of courts in these venues
demonstrate the feasibility of applying rules of evidence at sentencing.
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dence at sentencing, disparity among courts could result, which,
under the guidelines, translates into disparity in sentences for
defendants.3 65
The Federal Rules of Evidence also offer the significant advan-
tage of addressing the admissibility of a wide range of evidence. They
were developed to reflect the long history of common law evidence.
Now, after eighteen years of use, the Federal Rules have been applied
to all kinds of evidence likely to be presented at sentencing. With the
established body of law for interpreting the rules, parties can predict
what evidence will meet the standards of admissibility.
Applying the same evidentiary standards at sentencing as at trial
also would diminish the likelihood of defendants being charged with
"base conduct" by prosecutors hoping to greatly increase the sentence
by demonstrating relevant conduct at sentencing. With the hearsay
rule applicable at sentencing, initially raising relevant conduct at sen-
tencing would be less attractive. The government would still be able
to present additional evidence of relevant conduct at sentencing, but
the evidence would have to meet established admissibility standards.
The government would have an easier burden than at a trial, because
the standard of proof would be a preponderance of the evidence
rather than beyond a reasonable doubt. But the government could
not convict the defendant for "base conduct" and then increase the
defendant's sentence with inadmissible hearsay evidence, even with
corroboration.
While applying the Federal Rules of Evidence at sentencing
would not prohibit evidence of uncharged conduct, it does highlight
the distinction between standards of evidence and substantive deter-
minations about relevant conduct. The Federal Rules of Evidence im-
pose a reliability filter on the evidence that can be considered. The
requirement of reliable evidence is distinct from the issue of whether
courts ought to sentence defendants for significantly different crimi-
nal acts than were proved at trial.
Equally important, the Federal Rules of Evidence are largely neu-
tral with respect to which party is offering the evidence. 366 The Fed-
eral Rules of Evidence governing reliability were developed after
much discussion over what constitutes reliable evidence. Much of the
365 See discussion supra note 3.
366 Of the 63 Federal Rules of Evidence, three may be readily identified that contain
special provisions for criminal cases depending on which party is using the evidence. Rule
404(b) permits evidence offered to prove a pertinent trait of character by an accused to
prove action in conformity therewith, but limits the introduction of such evidence by the
prosecution. FED. R. EvID. 404(b). The rape shield provision limits the admission of evi-
dence of the victim's past sexual conduct. FED. R. EvID. 412. Finally, Rule 803(8) pre-
cludes the use of public reports setting forth matters observed by law enforcement
personnel in criminal cases against defendants. FED. R. Evio. 803(8).
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evidence currently offered at sentencing is presented by the govern-
ment, particularly regarding relevant conduct and role in the offense.
Personal history factors currently have little impact on a defendant's
sentence. The guidelines are still developing, however, and commen-
tators have urged greater consideration of personal factors.3 67 Should
the guidelines be so amended, the Federal Rules of Evidence would
consistently apply to the newly relevant evidence.
Finally, the Federal Rules of Evidence are understood by the par-
ties at sentencing. The rules would not bring in a new system that
must be learned and interpreted. Reviewing the current sentencing
procedures demonstrates how the rules would fit into the system. A
look at the types of evidence commonly used at sentencing and an
evaluation of those types of evidence under the rules of evidence re-
veal that the rules may be extended in full to the sentencing phase,
with only minimal modifications.3 68
A. Compatibility with Existing Procedures
The sentencing proceeding is a forum easily adaptable to rules of
evidence. The parties are each represented by legal counsel.3 69 The
court and counsel are familiar with the rules of evidence.370 The is-
sues to be determined are well defined by the guidelines.37' The con-
siderations about how to use the rules of evidence at sentencing
involve trying to apply evidentiary rules to the existing sentencing pro-
cedure, without unnecessarily expanding the amount of time and re-
sources needed for sentencing.
Two fundamental components of the current sentencing process
are first, the court's acceptance of evidence from the trial or of the
367 Daniel J. Freed & Marc Miller, Handcuffing the SentencingJudge: Are Offender Charac-
teristics Becoming Irrelevant? Are Congressionally Mandated Sentences Displacing Judicial Discre-
tion?, 2 FED. SENTENCING REP. 189 (Dec. 1989/Jan. 1990) (arguing that the guidelines have
been read too narrowly, without regard for the enabling legislation which clearly contem-
plated continued consideration of personal characteristics). See also Koh, supra note 16, at
1127-28.
368 The applicability of rules of evidence to sentencing is further demonstrated by
their use in military proceedings. In military proceedings the fact-finder also determines
the sentence. The fact-finder may be ajury or ajudge. In either case, the Military Rules of
Evidence, which are almost identical to the Federal Rules of Evidence, are applied at the
presentencing proceeding, albeit in a relaxed manner. M. R. EvD. 1101(c). The applica-
tion of the rules of evidence at sentencing in the military is a result of the recognition that
the presentence proceeding is still an adversarial one.
369 Cf Michael H. Graham, Application of the Rules of Evidence in Administrative Agency
Formal Adversarial Adjudications: A New Approach, 1991 U. ILL. L. REv. 353 (arguing that
application of rules of evidence in administrative proceedings may be inappropriate be-
cause the parties are not represented by counsel).
370 Cf Kenneth Culp Davis, An Approach to Problems of Evidence in the Administrative Pro-
cess, 55 HARv. L. REv. 364, 396 (1942) (noting that parties in an administrative proceeding
may not be familiar with the rules of evidence).
371 See supra notes 148-53 and accompanying text.
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defendant's admission to the government's proffer at the guilty plea;
and second, the use of the presentence report as a focal point for
identifying disputed issues and providing notice prior to the sentenc-
ing hearing of any facts or conclusions in the presentence report that
a party wishes to challenge.
1. The Court's Acceptance of Trial or Plea Evidence
For the approximately sixteen percent of federal criminal cases
that proceed to trial,3 72 most of the fact-finding necessary for sentenc-
ing will be based on evidence presented at the trial, which accordingly
will have met the standards of the Federal Rules of Evidence.373 The
sentencing court is not bound by how the jurors viewed the evidence,
as may be demonstrated by their verdict, but may reach its own con-
clusions about the credibility of witnesses or reliability of the evi-
dence.3 74 The evidence presented at trial will provide the core
evidence for determining the level of the offense committed. Because
the offense level is determined by all relevant conduct, the court may
also consider evidence of criminal conduct beyond what was charged
in the indictment375 Such evidence frequently will have been the sub-
ject of testimony at trial as uncharged acts in a conspiracy or as other
bad acts admissible to show motive or intent.37 6 When there is rele-
vant conduct that was not brought out at trial, the court may obtain
additional information on that conduct.3 77
The remaining eighty-four percent of cases, which are resolved by
guilty pleas, will obviously not have the trial record on which to rely.
Nevertheless, the sentencing court does not start from zero. With a
372 In 1990, 40,452 of 46,725 federal criminal defendants pleaded guilty and the re-
maining 7,874 proceeded to trial. BuREAu oFJusTIcE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE,
SOURCEBOOK OF CuMINALJusTicE STATISTICS 528, tbl. 5.36 (1991).
373 A potential problem will occur when the trial judge is unavailable for sentencing,
for example, if the trial judge is unavailable. In the vast majority of cases, however, the
court which heard the trial will also sentence.
374 See, e.g., United States v. Stanberry, 963 F.2d 1323 (10th Cir. 1992) (finding that a
defendant convicted on drug-related charges was not entitled to a special jury determina-
tion of facts relevant only to sentencing). See supra note 251 (for additional cases in which
the sentencing judge has disregarded the jury's view of the evidence).
375 U.S.S.G., supra note 10, § 1B1.3.
376 Rule 404(b) provides that if certain conditions are met, evidence of other crimes,
wrongs, or acts is admissible at trial to prove "motive, opportunity, intent, preparation,
plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident." FED. R. EvID. 404(b). How-
ever, this evidence is not permitted if it is being used to prove "the character of a person in
order to show action in conformity therewith." Id.
377 This discussion reflects the current guidelines rule requiring sentencing to be
based on all relevant conduct. U.S.S.G., supra note 10, § 1B1.3. Manyjudges and scholars
have expressed their dismay with this rule, particularly when combined with the low pre-
ponderance of the evidence standard. See discussion supra note 159. If the guidelines were
amended to limit or exclude relevant conduct as a basis for sentencing, there would be a
substantial decrease in the issues to be resolved at sentencing.
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disposition by guilty plea, Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11 re-
quires that the court establish that there is a factual basis for the
plea.37 8 This may begin with the court asking the defendant to de-
scribe the events of the offense that is the subject of the guilty plea.
Or the court may initially ask the prosecutor to summarize the evi-
dence that would be produced if the case were to go to trial or to state
the relevant facts regarding the defendant's guilt. The prosecutor has
great latitude in how detailed the factual proffer is. When a defen-
dant is pleading guilty to an offense with a mandatory minimum sen-
tence, however, the prosecutor must clearly state the factual basis for
invoking the mandatory minimum. Often the proffer will be very spe-
cific, because this is the prosecutor's best opportunity to inform the
judge of the facts of the case.
Pursuant to Rule 11, the court asks the defendant to confirm that
the facts of the offense were stated correctly.3 79 If the defendant con-
firms that the statement of facts was correct, that statement may be
subsequently treated as fact in the sentencing process. If the defen-
dant disagrees with a portion of the prosecutor's statements, the court
should address the disputed facts. If the court believes that the disa-
greement is insignificant-such as regarding a specific time a crime
occurred-then the court may find that the defendant agrees with the
statement of facts in all material aspects.380 Where there is disagree-
ment as to a material element of the offense, the matter must be re-
solved before the plea of guilty may proceed. Consequently, at the
time of sentencing, the only factual disputes that should arise as to the
nature of the offense are ones arising from additional information
obtained after the plea proceeding. 38 '
In an effort to ensure that a plea "goes down," the court, the de-
fense, or the prosecutor may try to avoid a full discussion of the facts
at this stage. Prior to the guidelines, this avoidance posed few
problems. If a defendant had admitted the elements of the crime,
there was no need to discuss further details. When mandatory mini-
mums were introduced, the only added fact to be established at the
plea was the amount of the drugs or other element triggering the
mandatory minimum. With the introduction of sentencing guide-
lines, the requirements for a guilty plea were not changed. Under
378 "The court should not enter ajudgment upon such [a guilty] plea without making
such inquiry as shall satisfy it that there is a factual basis for the plea." FED. R. GrIM. P.
11(f).
379 FED. R. GRIM. P. 11 (f).
380 FED. R. CRIM. P. 11.
381 As noted in United States v. Peak, 992 F.2d 39 (4th Cir. 1993), courts routinely
accept pleas before considering the presentence report. Because the presentence report
often contains factual findings that the defendant will attempt to challenge, factual dis-
putes after the plea proceeding are common. Id.
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Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11, a court must determine that
the defendant's plea is voluntary after ensuring that the defendant has
been informed of the rights to trial and counsel and that the defen-
dant understands the nature of the charge to which the plea is offered
and any pertinent mandatory minimum or maximum sentence.38 2
Importantly, however, Rule 11 does not require that the defen-
dant be informed of a preliminary assessment of the sentencing guide-
lines.38 3 Most defendants are so informed by their counsel, and by the
government if a plea agreement is involved.3 84 But there is no re-
quirement under either Rule 11 or under the sentencing guidelines
that key sentencing issues be resolved at the plea stage.38 5 For exam-
ple, there is no requirement that the government inform the defen-
dant of all the relevant conduct it intends to describe to the
presentence report writer. Nor is the government required to inform
the defendant if it intends to assert that the defendant was a supervi-
sor or leader, such that the sentence could be raised under the
guidelines.
At present, there is little incentive for the prosecutor to raise
these issues at the plea38 6 and in some cases the prosecutor will not yet
have information about relevant conduct or the defendant's role in an
offense. Even if the prosecutor does have the information, there is no
requirement to have the defendant admit to such things as relevant
conduct. Instead, the prosecutor may choose to present that informa-
382 FED. R. GRIM. P. 11 (c).
383 United States v. Stephens, 906 F.2d 251, 253 (6th Cir. 1990) (finding that at the
time defendant entered his plea, he "was adequately informed of the consequences of his
plea, even if the specific Guideline range was not known by him"); United States v. Salva,
902 F.2d 483, 486-87 (7th Cir. 1990); United States v. Gomez-Cuevas, 917 F.2d 1521, 1526
(10th Cir. 1990); United States v. Rhodes, 913 F.2d 839, 843 (10th Cir. 1990), cert. denied,
498 U.S. 1122 (1991); United States v. Henry, 893 F.2d 46, 48 (3d Cir. 1990); United States
v. Turner, 881 F.2d 684, 686 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 871 (1989); United States v.
Fernandez, 877 F.2d 1138, 1143 (2d Cir. 1989).
384 See, e.g., United States v. Craig, 985 F.2d 175, 179-80 (4th Cir. 1993) (erroneous
estimate by defendant's counsel insufficient ground to allow defendant to withdraw plea).
385 The guidelines direct a district court to defer its decision to accept or reject a plea
agreement until the court has considered the presentence report, unless the report is not
required. U.S.S.G., supra note 10, § 6B1.1 (c). This language indicates that the Commis-
sion wants the court to be aware of areas of disagreement before accepting a defendant's
plea. However, courts routinely accept pleas before reviewing the presentence report. See,
e.g., Peak, 992 F.2d at 40 (reviewing court noted that presentence investigations normally
are not conducted until after the guilty plea is entered).
386 Effective November 1, 1993, the commentary to U.S.S.G. § 6B1.2 was amended to
include a paragraph encouraging the prosecuting attorney to disclose to the defendant
relevant facts and circumstances concerning the offense and offender characteristics
before the defendant enters a plea of guilty or no/o contendere. U.S.S.G. § 6B1.2, supra note
10, at App. C, amend. 495. According to the Commission, the intent of the amendment
was to promote "plea negotiations that realistically reflect probable outcomes." Id. The
amendment specifies that it does not provide defendants with "any rights not otherwise
recognized by law." Id.
1994]
CORNELL LAW REVIEW
tion in the course of the presentence investigation to the presentence
writer.3 87 Once such information is incorporated into the
presentence report, most courts will accept it, noting that hearsay is
admissible at sentencing, and will deny the defendant's challenge to
the allegation of additional criminal conduct unless the defendant
can present evidence to the contrary.88 Thus, it becomes the defen-
dant's burden to disprove alleged relevant conduct.
If the government were not permitted to rely on hearsay, particu-
larly hearsay presented via the presentence report, the equation
would change. If the government were required to establish facts by
admissible evidence, even under the low standard of preponderance,
the government would have a greater incentive to be candid with the
defendant at the plea stage and to state the known facts reflecting
relevant conduct, role in the offense, or other sentencing factors at
the time of the plea.3 89
Presently judges decide individually whether to require that the
defendant be under oath when concurring in the statement of facts
that serves as the basis of the plea. Whether or not the defendant is
under oath, any statement that the defendant agrees with the facts as
presented by the prosecutor is an admission that would appropriately
be admissible under the rules of evidence 390 Thus, if the Federal
Rules of Evidence are applied at sentencing, the prosecutor will have a
substantial incentive to be candid with the defendant at the time of
the plea. As a result, the sentencing process may be shorter than at
present where lengthy disputes may occur regarding relevant conduct.
The same incentives would exist for the prosecutor to candidly ad-
dress other frequently disputed facts that affect the sentence imposed,
such as whether the defendant supervised others in committing the
criminal acts.
Thus, whether a defendant's conviction is by trial or plea, at the
time of conviction there is a substantial factual basis for sentencing
already established. With either a trial or plea, there may be addi-
tional evidence of relevant conduct that was not admissible at trial.
387 Noting that probation officers (who author the presentence reports) sometimes
lack the resources to conduct independent investigations,Judge Heaney asserts that prose-
cutors often control the information contained in the presentence report. Gerald W. He-
aney, Rewisiting Dispaity: Debating Guidelines Sentencing, 29 AM. GRIm. L. REv. 771, 777
(1992).
388 United States v. Montoya, 967 F.2d 1, 3 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 507 (1992).
But see United States v. Leichtnam, 948 F.2d 370, 381-82 (7th Cir. 1991) (sentence vacated
and case remanded for resentencing by reviewing court which noted that information in
the presentence report was supplied by a government attorney and was totally
unsubstantiated).
389 See supra note 386.
390 A statement offered against a party which is the party's own statement is deemed
"not hearsay." FED. R. EvD. 801(d) (2) (A).
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2. The Use of the Presentence Report
The presentence report provides the key factual summary for the
sentencing process.391 In preparing the report, the presentence
writer may review court documents and interview government investi-
gators, victims, employers and acquaintances of the defendant. The
presentence writer will always attempt to interview the defendant and
the prosecutor or the case agent.
The extent to which the factual basis established at a plea or trial
is subsequently communicated to the presentence writer varies tre-
mendously. The presentence writer will rarely have been present
during the trial and thus the writer may obtain the first factual infor-
mation about the offense from the prosecutor, defense counsel, or
the defendant.3 92 In the case of a plea, the presentence writer may
have been in court during the plea proceeding and thus be familiar
with the proffered statement of facts. Where this was not the case, the
presentence writer again may have obtained the initial account of the
facts from the prosecutor, the defense counsel, or the defendant.
Otherwise, a transcript of the plea proceeding could be prepared and
provided to the presentence writer so that all parties move forward to
the sentencing phase with a common understanding of the facts.
Presentence reports now generally follow a standardized format
designed around the sentencing guidelines.3 93 The report may even
include a work sheet showing how the pregentence writer calculated
the defendant's sentencing range according to the guidelines. Once
the presentence report is completed, the presentence writer presents
it to the court in private.3 94 Prior to the scheduled date for sentenc-
ing, the report is provided to the defendant and the defendant's
counsel and to the prosecutor.395 At that time, each side reviews the
report to assess whether there are any errors. A party who believes
there is an error, in the stated facts or conclusions, notifies the court,
probation office and opposing counsel. Because the presentence
writer has consulted both sides prior to writing the report, there are
often no disputes with the factual statements. More common are con-
tentions that the facts have been misinterpreted. For example, the
parties may disagree about whether the defendant's refusal to discuss
391 This report is mandatory "unless the court finds that there is information in the
record sufficient to enable the meaningful exercise of sentencing authority... and the
court explains this finding on the record." U.S.S.G., supra note 10, § 6A1.1.
392 See supra note 387 and accompanying text.
393 For an explanation of the contents of a presentence report, see supra note 202.
394 FED. R. CRIM. P. 32(c).
395 FED. R. CiuM. P. 32 (c) (3) requires that the report be provided "at a reasonable
time" before sentencing. As long as that requirement is met, the guidelines allow courts to
set their own procedures "to provide for the timely disclosure of the presentence report."
U.S.S.G., supra note 10, § 6A1.2.
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another's role in the offense indicates a lack of acceptance of
responsibility.3 96
At the time of sentencing, the presentence report is accepted by
the court as correct unless there are specified objections.39 7 The
court may decide what interpretation to give the facts or may hear
argument from the parties and then resolve the issues. The court gen-
erally holds a hearing on disputed factual issues.3 98 Because a party
must notify the court and opposing party of any facts the party dis-
putes, there is adequate notice for the parties to be prepared to pres-
ent evidence and to respond to evidence. At this phase the Federal
Rules of Evidence could easily be applied at hearings to resolve factual
disputes. Currently, when the defendant disputes a fact contained in
the presentence report, the defendant must present contrary evi-
dence.3 99 If the defendant fails to present such evidence, the court
may accept the presentence report as accurate. 400 This unfairly shifts
the burden to the defendant.
B. Key Evidence Under the Federal Rules
Much of the evidence currently considered at sentencing pro-
ceedings is already admissible under the Federal Rules of Evidence.
Courts have acknowledged this in cases challenging the low standards
of proof for evidence.
A key change would occur, however, in courts' reliance on hear-
say at sentencing. Much of the hearsay presented to courts is in the
presentence report. Consider how the rules would broadly address
hearsay at sentencing. The definition of nonhearsay and the many
exceptions to the hearsay prohibition still permit extensive hearsay,
although the basic hearsay rule is stated in the language of a prohibi-
tion. Examples of hearsay commonly used at sentencing that would
be admissible under the federal rules include statements by the defen-
dant that are offered by the government, as admissions of a party op-
ponent under rule 801(d) (2), and records of prior criminal conduct
396 See, e.g., United States v. Sanchez, 984 F.2d 769, 774 (7th Cir. 1993) (defendant's
request for reduction based on his acceptance of responsibility was properly denied be-
cause defendant failed to identify his drug supplier).
397 The presentence report need not be the only written material that the court re-
views. The commentary specifies that in determining facts relevant to sentencing, the
court may consider "any other relevant information" in addition to the presentence report.
U.S.S.G., supra note 10, § 6B1.4, comment. For example, the parties may submit sentenc-
ing memoranda which are a mixture of facts and arguments. But the presentence report is
usually the first sentencing document the court receives and comes with the imprimatur of
impartiality and professional investigation by a probation officer.
398 See supra note 180 and accompanying text.
399 The court has discretion to allow the defendant to introduce evidence regarding
alleged factual inaccuracies. FED. R. CIuM. P. 32(c) (3) (A).
400 See, e.g., United States v. Rogers, 1 F.3d 341, 345 (5th Cir. 1993).
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for which there was a conviction, admissible as judgments of previous
convictions under rule 803(22).
Some appellate courts have already answered defendants' argu-
ments that trial courts relied on hearsay at sentencing by pointing out
that the hearsay was admissible under the Federal Rules. In United
States v.Johnson,40' the Tenth Circuit concluded that a letter written by
the defendant and relied on at sentencing would not be hearsay be-
cause it was an admission under rule 801 (d) (2). Under the same rule,
the First Circuit, in United States v. Wright,40 2 held that an admission by
a defendant recounted to the court by a probation officer at sentenc-
ing was not hearsay.403
Examples of hearsay that would be excluded include an agent's
testimony about an informant's estimate of the quantity of drugs a
defendant distributed or about an informant's assertions of a defen-
dant's ties to organized crime. Applying the hearsay rule to evidence
such as the quantity of drugs distributed would greatly reduce the rel-
evant conduct problems that have so troubled courts.40 4
C. Making the Rules Applicable to Sentencing
No statute requires rules of evidence to be applied at sentencing
in federal courts.405 The Federal Rules of Evidence, which were
adopted in 1975, state that the rules, other than with respect to privi-
leges, do not apply at sentencing.40 6 Whether or not the Sentencing
Commission has the authority to issue guidelines governing eviden-
tiary standards at sentencing is a matter of some debate. 407 Clearly,
however, the Federal Rules of Evidence could be amended to extend
401 971 F.2d 562 (10th Cir. 1992).
402 873 F.2d 437 (1st Cir. 1991).
403 Id. at 441.
404 See supra notes 159 and 272 and accompanying text.
405 The Military Rules of Evidence provides, however, that rules of evidence apply at
the sentencing phase. M. R. Evil. 1101(c).
406 Federal Rule of Evidence 1101(d) states:
(d) Rules inapplicable. The rules (other than with respect to privileges)
do not apply in the following situations:
(1) Preliminary questions of fact. The determination of questions of
fact preliminary to admissibility of evidence when the issue is to be deter-
mined by the court under rule 104.
(2) Grand jury. Proceedings before grand juries.
(3) Miscellaneous proceedings. Proceedings for extradition or rendi-
tion; preliminary examinations in criminal cases; sentendng or granting or
revoking probation; issuance of warrants for arrest, criminal summonses,
and search warrants; and proceedings with respect to release on bail or
otherwise.
FED. R. EvID. 1101(d) (emphasis added).
407 See, e.g., HtrrcIsoN & YE=N, supra note 179, at 406 (observing that "[n]othing in
28 U.S.C. § 994 authorizes the Commission to prescribe evidentiary rules.").
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application of the rules governing reliability to sentencing
proceedings.
The Rules Enabling Act governs amendments to the Federal
Rules of Evidence.40 8 In accordance with this act, the Supreme Court
can prescribe rules of evidence. The Standing Commission on Rules
of Practice and Procedure of the Judicial Conference of the United
States can make proposals to the Supreme Court to change such pro-
cedural rules.40 9 When changes are prescribed by the Supreme
Court, Congress has seven months to respond, amend the proposal,
or delay the effective date of the amendment 410 Inaction by Congress
is taken as assent.41' In the alternative, Congress may initiate changes
to the Federal Rules of Evidence by legislation. Of the six substantive
changes made to the Federal Rules of Evidence since 1975, Congress
initiated three.412
A proposal to amend the Federal Rules of Evidence must specify
which rules should govern sentencing.41 3 Several of the rules would
be inapplicable to the issue of reliability of evidence, including those
that limit the introduction of evidence of a defendant's prior criminal
conduct.414 The rules applicable to sentencing should include those
that impose reliability standards, such as the rules governing opinion
and expert testimony,415 hearsay,41 6 authentication, 4 7 and contents of
writings.41 8 Application of these rules, which are neutral to the defen-
dant and government, would fairly raise the reliability of evidence re-
lied upon at sentencing.
408 28 U.S.C. §§ 2071-74 (1993).
409 28 U.S.C. § 2073 (1993). The Standing Committee consists of members of the
bench and bar. Id. The ChiefJustice appoints these members. Becker & Orenstein, supra
note 263, at 860 n.6. The Supreme Court appoints separate Advisory Committees in the
civil, criminal, appellate, and bankruptcy areas to propose rule changes. Id. at 860. How-
ever, no advisory committee has ever been established for evidence rules. The civil and
criminal Advisory Committees currently are responsible for monitoring and proposing
changes to the Federal Rules of Evidence. Id.
410 28 U.S.C. § 2074(a) (1993).
411 28 U.S.C. § 2074(a) (1993). A different procedure applies to changes affecting
privilege rules; for those Congress must approve any changes. 28 U.S.C. § 2074(b) (1993).
412 SALTZBURG & REDDEN, FEDERAL RuLEs OF EVIDENCE MANuAL 774 (1990).
413 FED. R. EVID. 1101(d)(3).
414 Under the current sentencing guidelines, such prior criminal conduct may be rele-
vant, either as relevant conduct or as criminal history. U.S.S.G., supra note 10, §§ 1B1.3
and 4A1.1.
415 FED. R. EVID. 701-06.
416 FED. R. EvrD. 801-06.
417 FED. R. EVID. 90103.
418 FED. R. EvID. 1001-07.
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CONCLUSION
Recent decisions have highlighted the concern about the reliabil-
ity of fact-finding at guidelines sentencing. Some judges and scholars
have urged that the Constitution requires more procedural protec-
tions at guidelines sentencing, but this argument has not prevailed.
Others have urged adoption of specific rules for sentencing. Propos-
als have addressed the issues of kinds of evidence to be considered,
burdens of proof and the quality of the evidence. Much confusion
about these issues has arisen because of the lack of clarity about what
errors are problematic and how burdens of proof and standards of
reliability for evidence jointly affect the quantity and kind of errors.
This article has addressed this issue of error. For decisions where
the least total error is desired, the preponderance of the evidence bur-
den of proof is appropriate. But this burden should be applied to
require that the fact-finder be persuaded that the alleged fact is more
probable than not. For decisions similar to determining guilt, where
the goal is to have fewer errors bome by defendants, imposing a bur-
den of proof on the government of clear and convincing proof or
proof beyond a reasonable doubt may be appropriate.
To achieve the level of confidence in the preponderance of the
evidence standard for sentencing that now exists in civil cases, stan-
dards of reliability should be applied to the evidence presented at sen-
tencing proceedings. This article suggests a simple solution: apply
the existing Federal Rules of Evidence at sentencing. Fact determina-
tions at sentencing now have a direct and identifiable impact on the
penalty imposed. Accordingly, the reliability of fact determinations at
sentencing is critical to achieving the goals of lessening disparity, sen-
tencing fairly, and instilling confidence in sentencing decisions.
The fact determinations at guidelines sentencing are the type of
specific judgments for which the Federal Rules of Evidence are
designed. The rules provide a familiar guide to the admissibility of
evidence. They consistently impose minimum standards of reliability,
neutral to the government and defendant.
This proposal has another virtue. Judges, who understand the
problems that have arisen from faulty fact-finding at sentencing, can
use their authority under the Rules Enabling Act to adopt such rules.
Or Congress may legislate the change. The Commission, even if it has
the authority, has shown no inclination to exercise it. Courts have felt
constrained by precedent in deciding individual cases, even though
that precedent arose under a fundamentally different sentencing sys-
tem. By amending the Federal Rules of Evidence to apply to sentenc-
ing, judges or Congress can affirmatively choose to have all sentences
based on reliable evidence.
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